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The economic performance of the Euro area continues to 
disappoint. This is the Fourth Report of the European 
Forecasting Network. Once again we have had to revise down 
our forecast for economic prospects over the next two years. 
The recovery in economic activity that we have been expecting 
to appear during 2003 has not materialised. Assailed by a 
number of negative shocks from high oil prices, an 
appreciating Euro against the dollar, continuing geopolitical 
uncertainty, and a slow movement towards the liberalisation of 
labour and goods markets, economic recovery continues to be 
sluggish. GDP will only grow by 0.5% in 2003 and just 1.5% 
in 2004. In both years GDP growth will be reliant upon the 
strength of the services sector. Indeed, on a quarter on quarter 
basis Euro area GDP declined by 0.1% in the second quarter. 
We now believe that the chances of a technical recession of 
two consecutive falls in GDP in the Euro area during 2003 is as 
high as forty percent (figure 1). 
Inflation continues to push up against the 2% ceiling though 
the output gap and the appreciation of the Euro have helped to 
ease the pressure on costs and we expect that inflation will 
move below 2% during 2004. There has been recently 
considerable discussion of the possibility for deflation - actual 
falls in the price level - in both the United States and Europe. 
Nevertheless, we think this is unlikely. The inflation fan chart 
in figure 2, suggests that the probability of deflation in the Euro 
area is very small. 
The unexpectedly slow economic recovery has also been 
mirrored in fiscal positions. 3 of the 12 members of the Euro 
area have been, or are, in excess of the 3% deficit ceiling or 
close to it. In Portugal the deficit in 2001 reached 4.2% and the 
excessive deficit procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) have been triggered. Some special short term measures 
have enabled Portugal to bring its deficit below 3% in 2002 but 
it is forecasted to exceed the limit again in 2003. In 2002 the 
deficit reached 3.1% in France and 3.5% in Germany. A deficit 
of around 4% is expected for both countries in 2003. The 
excessive deficit procedures have been opened against both 
countries. 
Poor economic performance is also reflected in unemployment, 
which we now expect to climb steadily over 9% in 2004 as the 
Euro area continues to operate below full economic capacity. 
Some perspective on the current business cycle can be gained 
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Figure 1: Forecasts for Euro area growth. 







Figure 2: Forecasts for Euro area inflation. 
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area experienced a cyclical downturn - at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Then, of course, monetary policy was not 
centralised in the ECB, though the Bundesbank in practice 
played a significant leadership role in the setting of interest 
rates. In figure 3 we show growth of GDP for the periods 
from the first quarter of 1992 to the second quarter of 1995 
and compare this with the first quarter of 2000 to the second 
quarter of 2003. From the cyclical peak of 1991, output 
growth decelerated rapidly and was significantly negative in 
1993. Thereafter, the cyclical recovery was rapid with the 
Euro area returning to trend growth rates by 1994.  
The most recent downturn has been much more gradual but 
the recovery has also been very muted. Indeed after a small 
acceleration in growth during 2002, output in the Euro area 
as a whole, as we have already noted, actually fell in the 
second quarter of this year. By contrast, the economic cycle 
in the USA at the beginning of the 1990s was very similar to 
that of the more recent cycle with a very similar decline in 
output and then recovery (figure 4), though the extent and 
credibility of the recovery were stronger in the ‘90s, with 
larger benefits for the European countries. This feature, 
combined with an appreciated Euro against the dollar and 
sterling (the two main trading partners for the Euro area) and 
the general weakness in world economic activity, means that 
net exports will make a negative contribution to GDP during 
2003, see figure 5, and only a minor one in 2004. 
Most of the growth in 2003 and 2004 is due to internal 
demand, with a stable pattern for consumption but stronger 
capital formation in 2004. 
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was relaxed much more swiftly in the earlier period, reflecting 
in part that inflation was on a downward trend in the early 
1990s compared with the early part of the 21st Century (figure 
7). However, if we look at real short term interest rates (figure 
8), the relaxation in monetary policy was actually more 
pronounced in the later period. Overall, nominal and real 
interest rates are very low and the monetary conditions appear 
to be in place to provide the background to a stronger economic 
recovery, if only world trade could recover more quickly and 
geopolitical tensions and oil prices ease.  
About fiscal policy, in the initial stages of the 1992-3 downturn 
there was an initial deterioration in the deficit for the Euro area 
(though starting from a much larger deficit), followed by an 
improvement. By contrast, in the current downturn the fiscal 
deficit has continued to deteriorate. The general impression is 
that the fiscal position is caused by the slowdown rather than 
causing it. Overall, without structural reforms of the labour 
market and the welfare system, increased competition in the 
good and services market, and policies to foster long run 
growth such as investment in education and R&D, the Euro 
area growth will continue to be mostly based and dependent on 
hardly controllable external factors. 
Table 1.  Economic outlook for the Euro area 











GDP 0.5 0.6 1.5 2.2
2.1 1.4
Potential Output 2.2 2.4 1.9 2.3
0.8 0.6Private 
Consumption 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.9
-2.5 -0.9Fixed Capital 
Formation -1.8 -1.2 1.2 3.4
-1.1 2.1
Exports -0.5 0.4 4.0 5.8
0.6 1.7
Imports 1.4 2.4 3.9 6.0
8.9 9.1Unemployment 
Rate 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.5
1.4 0.7
HICP 2.1 2.6 1.7 2.7
Percentage change in the average level compared with the same period a year earlier, 
except for unemployment rate that is expressed in levels. Point forecasts and 80% 
































Figure 8: Real short term 





















Figure 6: Short term nominal 
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Table 1 provides a summary of our forecasts for the main 
macroeconomic variables. The rest of this executive summary 
describes the contents of chapters 2 to 8 of the report. 
Additional details can be found in a set of Annexes, freely 
available on the EFN website at www.efn.uni-bocconi.it. 
__________________________ 
In the previous Report we drew attention to the importance for 
the medium term development of the European Union of the 
accession of 10 more countries. We now therefore include in 
our report a chapter with the macroeconomic outlook and 
forecasts for the Accession countries. Despite weaker-than-
expected growth in the Euro area, Accession countries fared 
fairly well in 2002 and early 2003. Private consumption and 
government spending compensated for weaker export growth. 
Inflation staged a major decline over the last 18 months and is 
expected to remain subdued in the nearest future. Following 
sharp interest rate cuts in 2001 and 2002, monetary authorities 
are mow more cautious. The state of public finances remains 
the largest obstacle to nominal convergence with the EU. 
__________________________ 
In the macroeconomic outlook for the Accession countries we 
have drawn particular attention to the need for many of the 
larger Accession countries to sharply reduce budget deficits in 
the next five years. The build-up in government spending in the 
larger Accession countries over the last few years has resulted 
in a public finance position that is not sustainable in the longer 
term. Furthermore, their fiscal situations may serve to prevent 
the economies not only from meeting the Maastricht criteria for 
public finance deficits, but also from reaching their growth 
potential.  
In particular, the fiscal balances of the three Central European 
candidates for EU membership—Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic—have deteriorated considerably over the last 
two years. The Pre-Accession Economic Programs presented to 
the European Commission in late August 2003 provide the only 
official source documents outlining plans for reducing the 
public sector deficits in the years 2003-2006. With the 
exception of the Czech government, all three programs appear 
to be overly optimistic about economic growth and therefore 
the chances of reducing public finance deficits in the near-term. 
In addition, they are not binding and provide governments with 
substantial flexibility in designing each year's budget. Despite 
announced plans to implement legally binding medium-term 
spending programs, the governments are likely to make 
expenditure adjustments based on short-term priorities.  
___________________________ 
An important issue for understanding the fiscal position among 
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the resulting chronology of expansions and recessions. The 
transition from a centrally planned economy in the 1990s, with 
a sharp downturn in economic activity followed by a period of 
sustained growth, makes the phenomenon of the classical
cycle, in which peaks are succeeded by absolute declines in 
activity, of comparatively little interest with respect to the 
deviation cycle, in which deviations from the trend level 
matter.  
The analysis of deviation cycles shows that cycles in the 
Accession countries tend to have a larger amplitude than those 
for the current EU countries. In terms of convergence, cross-
correlation coefficients indicate a high correlation between the 
Baltic States (as well as between them and the Czech 
Republic), between the limited set of Euro area countries 
considered and, as well, between Hungary and Poland 
separately and the Euro area countries. The comparison of the 
present situation with previous enlargements shows a lower 
degree of convergence. Though this provides evidence against 
the acceptability of a single monetary policy for the Accession 
countries, further elements such as the extent of trade 
integration and the gains from enhanced financial stability 
point in the opposite direction. Therefore the issue deserves a 
deeper analysis, partly conducted in the next chapter of the 
report. 
___________________________ 
Much of the academic debate around Euro area enlargement 
has focused on the choice of the appropriate monetary regime 
in Accession countries prior to EU accession and on an 
analysis of the benefits of joining the Euro compared to the 
associated costs. 
Currently Accession countries use a variety of exchange rate 
regimes, spanning the whole spectrum from fixed to freely 
floating exchange rates. In the early 1990s, at the beginning of 
their transition period, most countries chose some kind of fixed 
system while others, like Slovenia, opted for more flexible 
solutions. Since then, there has been a generalised move 
towards more flexible exchange rates (for example, the Czech 
Republic and Poland have fully flexible exchange rates), going 
in the opposite direction to the supposed entry into the Euro, 
even though the exchange rate volatility against the Euro has 
not increased and real exchange rates, which matter most for 
economic performance, are not far away from the real rates that 
countries such as Italy or Finland faced before adopting the 
Euro.  
The central policy question is how fast should the Accession 
countries move towards monetary union and the adoption of 
the Euro. We believe that economic convergence will not be 
best served by early membership of EMU. There is not only the 
risk of foreign exchange market turbulence if the currencies of 
the Accession countries came under sustained speculative 
attack, but also the lesson of East Germany which was 
The behaviour 
of the exchange 
rates, the type 
and the size of 
the economic 
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effectively transferred to full monetary union with West 
Germany overnight and at a completely inappropriate real 
exchange rate. Finally, the size and type of shocks that hit these 
countries are rather heterogeneous and different from those of 
the current Euro area countries. 
__________________________ 
The sixth enlargement of the European Union raises another 
important policy question. Although the aggregate economic 
impact of accession on existing members is small, it is quite 
large for the Accession countries and there are important issues 
at the level of regions that need to be addressed. What would 
the best policies be for the EU to fuel real convergence of the 
new membersat the national and regional level? 
Numerous concerns have been raised about the design and 
implementation of current EU structural (regional) policies and 
their ability to achieve stated targets. Excluding Ireland, there 
is little evidence for significant convergence of the first 
generation countries at the regional level. Clearly, the quality 
of local institutions and economic conditions in regions 
benefiting from European funding has been key to the success 
or failure of regional policies. 
In the light of the lack of evidence concerning the effect of 
structural funds on long run growth, and the acute political 
tensions their availability and allocation creates among current 
members, it could be argued that regional structural funds, 
within an enlarged EU, should be reformed. This applies, even 
more so, to the funding of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
Theory suggests that structural funds are pure income transfers 
with little long-run effects. They may lead to a suboptimal 
allocation of regional labour, capital and entrepreneurial 
resources and to a self-perpetuating system of expectations in 
which below average income levels are almost “sought” by the 
regional administrations as a conduit for additional structural 
funding. Empirical evidence is mixed. Ireland has been an 
undoubted success story, but the Mezzogiorno of Italy has 
failed to converge on the northern part of Italy, despite 
significant inflows of structural funds.  
Among the many suggestions contained in the report, the 
following are the most crucial.  
• A drastic lowering of the maximum income for 
admission to funding at the level of 50% of the 
EU15 average.  
• A reduction of the number of objectives to be 
pursued (as proposed by the Commission in 1998). 
• Objective 1, properly rephrased to focus on 
structural deficiencies (especially large public 
goods, transportation and communication 
infrastructures and environmental protection), is 
We then analyse 
the design and 
implementation 









the only one that should be retained on a 
permanent basis. However, in the light of the 
accession of 10 more countries, it appears that 
objective 2 (recovery from industrial restructuring) 
and objective 5 (agriculture structural 
transformation) should also be maintained during 
the first budgeting cycle following admission 
(2007-2013) because of the importance of both 
industrial and agricultural restructuring for these 
countries.  
_______________________________________ 
To add to the debate concerning the effectiveness of structural 
funds at the regional level we have also conducted a study of 
infrastructure investment in Spain. The issue is whether 
infrastructure investment eventually supported by European 
funds leads to convergence at the regional level. We provide an 
analysis of the effects of infrastructure investment on regional 
economic growth. We assume that the effect on productivity 
depends on what type of public infrastructure is put in place, so 
that local infrastructures would enhance economic activity in 
the area where they are located, whereas transport and 
communication infrastructure may produce benefits in the area 
where they are located and spillovers to other regions. These 
spillovers can be either positive or negative.  
We argued above that the macroeconomic conditions in 
Accession countries are similar in many ways to those of 
previous entrants such as Spain at the time of its accession. So 
the experience of Spain can provide guidance as to what may 
happen to the new entrants. Therefore, our empirical results 
may throw light on the possible effect of infrastructure on the 
takeoff of less-developed economies, which are opening and 
modernising their productive structure as a consequence of 
their entrance to the EU.  
It turns out that the effects of transport infrastructure is small, 
declining over time, and with negative spillovers on 
neighbouring regions. Yet, given the rather modest stock of 
public capital, there is room to faster growth through public 
investment in the Accession countries. 
________________________________ 
Finally, we evaluate whether accession can modify the 
economic geography of the Accession countries. In particular, 
since in centrally planned economies, market forces are not 
allowed to operate, we might expect to see a concentration of 
certain sectors and higher relative wages in the region where 
the capital city is. 
When we examine regional wages and employment shares in 
The effect of public 
infrastructure 
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the Central and Eastern European Countries in their reaction to 
the increased access to EU markets, three main results emerge. 
First, there is a strong effect of the capital city on relative 
wages. On average, being a capital city produces a 32% higher 
wage, and doubling the distance from the capital reduces 
relative wages by 4%.  
Second, proximity to the EU seems to give an advantage in 
terms of relative wages. However, this effect only reflects the 
wage premium enjoyed by border regions. Workers' wages in 
those regions are on average 2.8 % higher.  
Finally, the share of service employment (in the private as well 
as in the public sector) is strongly concentrated in capital city 
regions. The comparison with the current EU countries shows 
that these concentrations are significantly stronger in the 
Accession countries than in the long-established member 
states.  
What can we conclude from this analysis? The extreme 
centralisation of wages and service sectors in Central European 
capital cities is likely to erode and give way to a more even 
distribution of wages and service sector employment driven by 
market access. Moreover, Accession countries that have 
regions that border the current EU stand to gain most in terms 
of relative wages and employment growth in dynamic sectors, 
confirming the findings in the previous EFN report. 
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Euro Area Outlook and Forecasts
Economic outlook for 2003 and 2004 
In the first half of 2003, the Euro area economy remained 
sluggish. Seasonally adjusted GDP did not exceed its level in 
the second half of 2002. 
After the quick end of military action in Iraq, geopolitical 
tensions eased in the spring but a high degree of uncertainty is 
still prevailing. The persistent economic imbalances outside the 
Euro area, notably the continuing twin deficit in the US, 
prevent a quick recovery of confidence. Moreover, in the 
course of the recent downturn, the business sector worldwide 
and in the Euro area has undertaken measures to reduce debt 
levels and to increase profitability. While these restructurings 
improved the prospects for a rebound of profits and investment, 
they were associated with a layoff of workers in the short run, 
exerting a negative influence on employment expectations and 
on the willingness of households to consume. 
The marked appreciation of the euro vis à vis the US dollar, but 
also against other major currencies, in 2002 and in the first half 
of 2003 is taking its toll. Though the appreciation has taken 
away the gain in Euro area competitiveness realized with the 
depreciation of the euro between 1999 and 2001, the real 
effective exchange rate of the euro is now at the level observed 
when the common currency was introduced. At present, cost 
competitiveness of Euro area companies is roughly at its long 
term average over the past 20 years. 
The development of Euro area net exports since autumn 2002 
reflects the appreciation of the euro. While exports decreased 
significantly, imports grew more than implied by the sluggish 
domestic demand. Obviously, producers switched to imported 
intermediate goods, and stocks of finished goods were mainly 
replenished by imports. The stronger euro squeezes profits 
from exports to markets outside the Euro area. If exporters try 
to hold the euro prices constant, demand for their products will 
decline. If, on the other hand, companies try to retain export 
volumes by maintaining the price in foreign currency, revenues 
transferred into euros will decrease. When assessing the effects 
of the appreciation of the euro, the focus often lies on the 
negative impact on exports. It has to be kept in mind, however, 
that a stronger euro reduces euro import prices. In principle, 
imported intermediate goods as well as raw materials such as 
oil become cheaper, thereby reducing production costs. To the 
extent that the cost relief is passed on to consumers, a rise in 
real disposable income is induced. As the increase of consumer 



































































Overall, the impact of a euro appreciation on GDP growth is 
negative. As simulation results documented in earlier EFN 
reports show, a ten percent appreciation of the euro with 
respect to the US dollar reduces the GDP growth rate in the 
range of 0.2-0.3 percentage points once all adjustment 
processes have run their course. 
In the first half of the year, the muted profit prospects caused 
by the delayed global economic recovery and by the euro 
appreciation led to weak capital formation. Due to the slower 
accumulation of capital, potential output growth started to 
decline. 
The negative contributions of investment and net exports were 
parti lly offset by private consumption.  Disposable income in 
real terms was fuelled by the fall in inflation. However, though 
households continued to expand their purchases, consumption 
remained subdued. This is in particular related to the 
dampening impact of the increase in unemployment. The 
worsening employment expectations exerted a negative impact 
on consumer confidence. 
A gradual recovery of the Euro area economy is predicted over 
the forecasting horizon. Both internal and external factors are 
expected to contribute. In the latter part of this year and more 
pronounced in 2004 production in the major world regions will 
gain momentum. World trade will expand by 4 percent in 2003 
and by around 7.5 percent in 2004. This is supported by a 
rising investment activity in particular in the US and to a lesser 
extent in Japan. Also, expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies are expected to stimulate economic activity in the US. 
Due to robust domestic demand, growth has remained robust in 
Southeast Asia as well as in the Central and Eastern European 
countries which will join the European Union in May 2004. 
Details about the assumptions of important exogenous 
variables are summarized in box 1, in page 15. Our forecast of 
a gradual recovery of the Euro area economy is supported by 
the view that we do not expect further marked exchange rate 
movements of the euro. In fact, the current level of the 
exchange rate reasonably reflects economic fundamentals. A 
slight depreciation of the euro in real effective terms of around 
0.2 percent is expected for 2004. The impact of the euro 
appreciation will fade out over time, and the rising external 
demand will stimulate exports. The improved profit prospects 
are expected to induce investors to increase their production 
capacities. Investment will also benefit from the fact that the 
long-lasting weakness of capital formation has increased the 
obsolescence of the capital stock. Furthermore, financing 
conditions are supported by the ECB interest rate cuts by 125 
basis points since December 2002. From a historical 
perspective, interest rates in the Euro area are currently very 
low, both in nominal and real terms. We expect no significant 
changes over the forecasting period. In addition, stock markets 
have recovered from their recent troughs observed in the 
spring. 
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tight public finances in a number of Euro area countries, 
notably in the larger ones. On the other hand, some countries 
are expected to pursue counter-cyclical fiscal policies. The 
latter effect will stabilise government consumption growth in 
the short run. 
After two years of very low growth, labour productivity will 
gradually pick up in the forecasting period. Due to wage 
moderation labour costs will expand at a slower pace than in 
the previous years. Therefore, unit labour costs will grow 
slower than before. Profit prospects, approximated by the 
difference between HICP inflation and the increase in unit 
labour costs, will improve in 2003 and, more pronounced, in 
2004. This development in conjunction with the increasing 
production will back up investment behaviour. The euro 
appreciation observed until the middle of 2003 and a roughly 
constant oil price will contribute to a decrease in inflation, 
supporting real disposable income. In addition, the gradual 
recovery will restore the willingness of households to consume.
Potential GDP continues to increase faster than actual GDP in 
the next few quarters. While actual growth will accelerate 
gradually over the course of next year, potential growth is 
hampered by the weakness in fixed capital formation since 
2001. In Figure 1.0 we plot the output gap calculated using a 
production function approach. The gap widens until the first 
quarter of 2004 before it begins to decrease slightly as growth 
moves above the underlying growth potential. As a 
consequence of the lower trend growth rate, a rise in the 
NAIRU is predicted. Overall, this development exerts 
downward pressure on wage and price inflation. 
As can be seen from figure 1.1, a mild recession in the Euro 
area cannot be excluded at the 80 percent level of confidence 
for the next three quarters. Then, growth will gain momentum, 
but towards the end of the forecasting horizon, the quarterly 
rates are forecasted to decline. As they are based on lower 
initial levels, the y-o-y growth rates shown in figure 1.2 
continue to increase. 
Over the forecasting horizon domestic demand will become the 
driving force of the economic recovery, see figure 1.3. 
However, when compared to recent periods of upturns like 
1998-2000, domestic demand remains subdued. In particular, 
the weakness in private investment is critical, since it hampers 
capital accumulation and growth potential. Therefore, policies 
should support domestic demand by restoring confidence of 
consumers and investors. The low and even negative 
contribution of net exports is due to the euro appreciation and 
to the delayed recovery of the world economy.  
There are still factors preventing a quick expansion of the Euro 
area economy. Due to the persisting economic imbalances as 
well as the latent risks of further terrorist attacks, some degree 
of uncertainty will prevail. In comparison to the other major 
regions of the world economy, the recovery in the Euro area 
will be less pronounced and takes place even later. In 
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Table 1.1  Contribution of the production sectors to GDP growth 
 
Contributions of production sectors 
Year GDP growth Agriculture Industrial Construction Services Net taxes 
1999 2.82 0.08 0.23 0.12 2.10 0.29 
2000 3.50 -0.02 0.88 0.12 2.56 -0.04 
2001 1.59 -0.04 0.16 -0.03 1.61 -0.12 
2002 0.85 -0.01 0.19 -0.05 0.93 -0.22 
2003 0.48 0.02 -0.15 -0.12 0.79 -0.08 
2004 1.51 0.02 0.17 -0.01 1.27 0.04 















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Domestic Demand Net Exports
 
Percentage points; figures above the columns indicate overall GDP growth; 2003 and 2004: EFN 
forecasts 
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In the industrial sector in the EMU, energy will be in 2003 the 
most dynamic sector and capital, durable consumer and 
intermediate goods sectors still will register negative rates of 
change. In 2004 the mild recovery will be lead by the capital, 
intermediate, energy and non-durable consumer goods sectors. 
The production in durable consumer goods could remain for 
the fourth consecutive year with negative rates of change. In 
US the recovery in 2004 will be stronger. 
A disaggregated analysis of GDP by production sectors 
produces the forecasts in table 1.1, with total GDP growth in 
line with forecasts from our macroeconometric model. Figure 
1.4 reports the evolution of the economic sentiment indicator, 
where the expansion zones are in shadow. With information till 
mid-2000 a fall was already expected, but not as relevant as 
was finally observed. Recovery is not yet clear from the latest 
information available. 
Total inflation in the Euro area will average 2.1% and 1.7% in 
2003 and 2004, respectively assuming that the evolution of 
exchange rates and monetary policy variables in those years 
will be compatible with their performance in the past (see box 
3.). Core inflation will be quite stable with average annual rates 
of 1.9% in both 2003 and 2004. The monetary factors pushing 
up inflation are compensated by the behaviour of unit labour 
costs, the negative output gap and the appreciation of the euro. 
Consequently, over the forecasting horizon there arises no need 
for deviating from the current expansionary stance of monetary 
policy.  
Different institutions are currently considering a possible, 
although low, risk of deflation in the EMU. As figure 1.5 
shows, we think that the probability of deflation in the EMU is 
almost negligible. 
The inflation forecasts for the Euro area conceal a different 
inflation situation through countries in observed values and in 
expectations. Thus the expectations for 2004 go from 0.9% in 
Germany (including the increase in tobacco taxes) to 4.0% in 
Ireland. Consequently, the real interest rates show a large 
discrepancy, with one-year actual interest rates going from a 
negative 1.7% rate in Ireland to a positive 1.5% in Germany. 
This differential around three percentage points shows that 
countries in the Euro area are facing different investment 
conditions.  
The forecasts of the main macroeconomic aggregates are 
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General Economic Sentiment Indicator
Past Values and Forecast Intervals
(The shadowed areas correspond to periods in which de probability of being in an expansion  









1996-1 1997-1 1998-1 1999-1 2000-1 2001-1 2002-1 2003-1 2004-1 
Economic sentiment Indicator Economic sentim. Indicat. For (2000-7) 
Upper Interval 80% (2000-7) Lower Interval 80% (2000-7) 
Economic sentim. Indicat. For (2003-8) Upper Interval 70% (2003-08) 
Lower Interval 70%(2003-08)
Figure 1.4 







Table 1.2  Economic outlook for the Euro area 
 2000 2001 2002 2003: 1st half 2003: annual 2004: annual 
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BOX 2: THE EURO APPRECIATION AND INFLATION 
In order to analyse the effect of the appreciation of the euro against the US dollar and 
other currencies on total inflation in the Euro area, we are going to study the effect of the 
nominal effective exchange rate and the real effective exchange rate on each of the seven 
components into which the HICP has been broken down, namely, processed food, tobacco, 
non-energy industrial goods, services, unprocessed food and energy. This last component is 
also disaggregated into fuel and gas, which includes electricity and gas prices. For all these 
components except fuel, we consider linear univariate time series models, and for fuel non-
linear models with leading indicators. Then, the exchange rate enters all the relations as an 
additional explanatory variable. Due to data limitations, we focus on a narrow group of major 
Euro area trading partners (United States, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Canada, Australia, Hong-Kong, Korea and Singapore). 
The results show that both the nominal and real exchange rates only have a minor 
effect on inflation. However, the model for domestic fuel prices already includes international 
crude prices in euros as an explanatory variable. Therefore, the results indicate that the 
exchanges rate does not exert an independent influence on inflation beyond the effect on fuel 
prices. The fact that in our time series models we do not find a direct effect of the exchange 
rate means that in forecasting inflation in 2003 and 2004 our models rely on the past 
performance of the system that is finally incorporated in price lags. Therefore our inflation 
forecasts for 2003 and 2004 are implicitly assuming that the evolution of exchange rates and 
monetary policy variables in those years will be compatible with their performance in the 
past. 
The exogenous variables for the forecasts are shown in the table below. For the 
most important world economic regions outside the EU, i.e. the US and Japan, a gradual 
economic recovery over the forecasting horizon is expected. This is reflected in an increase 
in the GDP growth rates; while inflation will remain moderate. For the oil price, a slightly 
decrease from 28 to 27 US dollar per barrel is expected for 2004. The depreciation rate of 
the capital stock is around 5% p.a. Results are robust to small changes in this parameter. It 
is included in the equations for capital accumulation and the user cost of capital. 
Table 1.3: Exogenous variables for EFN forecasts 
  2003 2004 
Population Euro Area 303.1 303.1 
Capital Depreciation Rate 4.8 4.8 
Japan Consumer Price Inflation -0.3 -0.4 
Japan GDP Growth Rate 1.9 1.2 
Japan Long Term Interest Rate 0.6 0.6 
Japan Short Term Interest Rate 0.1 0.1 
US Consumer Price Inflation 2.3 1.8 
US GDP Growth Rate 2.6 3.9 
US Long Term Interest Rate 3.6 3.6 
US Short Term Interest Rate 1.3 1.3 
Oil Price 28.0 27.0 
Population in million people, oil price in US dollar per barrel, all other variables in percent 
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BOX 3:   EURO AREA CONVERGENCE OF INFLATION AND OUTPUT GROWTH 
 
In the early stages of monetary union, before the integrating forces of financial and trade 
linkages work themselves through, there is likely to be divergences between member states 
that reflect the extent to which the initial exchange rates at which monetary union was set are 
not quite right. In these circumstances individual member states can alter their 
competitiveness by adjustments to domestic prices and wages. But measures of dispersion 
also provide a guide to the extent to which economic convergence fluctuates over the business 
cycle because member states are experiencing the same shock but responding differently or 
experiencing different shocks. Moreover, convergence in the level of per capita incomes 
between the poorest and the richest member states requires differences in growth rates. 
 
In Chart 1 and 2 we plot Boxplots of output growth and inflation for the Euro 12 countries. A 
boxplot provides a visual interpretation of the variability across members, and is less sensitive 
than other measures of dispersion to outliers. The shaded box is the inter-quartile range, so it 
covers 50 percent of the member states. The solid line within the box is the median. The 
'whiskers' that extend above and below the box are up to 1½ times the interquartile range. 
Any observations lying outside of this range are individually marked. So we see that on 
growth (we have excluded Ireland since it is an extreme outlier, while data is incomplete for 
Luxembourg) Greece was an outlier in 2001 and 2002. It is also noticeable that the variability 
of inflation rates across the Euro area has risen since 1999, while the variability in growth 
rates has diminished.  
10101010101010N =
Growth Rate for EU-12












































Table 1.4  Comparison of EFN forecast with alternative forecasts 
  EFN EU IMF ECB OECD Consensus
  2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
GDP 0.5 1.5 1.0 2.3 0.5 1.9 0.7 1.6 1.8 2.7 0.5 1.7 
Private Consumption 1.1 1.3 1.2 2.0 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.7 1.5 2.5 1.2 1.6 
Gov. Consumption 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Fixed Capital Form. -1.8 1.2 0.3 3.2 -0.2 3.1 -1.1 2.1 1.6 3.1 -0.9 2.2 
Unemployment rate 9.0 9.3 8.8 8.8 9.1 9.2 - - 8.5 8.3 8.9 9.0 
HICP 2.1 1.7 2.1 1.7 2.0 1.6 2.0 1.3 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.5 
Industrial Production -0.1 1.4 - - - - - - - - 0.2 1.8 
EU: European Commission, European Economy, No. 2, 2003; IMF: World Economic Outlook, September 
2003; ECB: ECB Monthly Bulletin, June 2003, OECD: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 73, June 2003; 
Consensus: Consensus Economics Inc., Consensus Forecasts, September 2003. IMF forecasts for demand 
aggregates are for the European Union. ECB figures correspond to their macroeconomic projections. 
Numbers in the table refer to the mean of the respective projected interval. 
Comparison with alternative forecasts 
The forecasts presented above were obtained from the EFN 
macroeconometric model, described in detail in the Spring 
2002 report. Table 1.4 reports a comparison of the EFN 
forecasts for the main macroeconomic aggregates with 
alternative forecasts, notably those of the European 
Commission, the IMF, the European Central Bank, the 
OECD, and Consensus Economics Inc. 
To some extent, the comparison must be biased because of 
the different information set. Generally speaking, the most 
recent forecasts are more pessimistic than the ones carried out 
a few months ago. This reflects the fact, that the recovery in 
the Euro Area will take place later than previously 
anticipated. 
However, for both years of the forecasting horizon, the EFN 
outlook seems to be more pessimistic, in particular regarding 
the development of private consumption. This can be traced 
to the worse unemployment forecast with its negative impact 
on disposable income. Although the IMF has almost the same 
unemployment outlook, it expects a more pronounced 
acceleration of private consumption. This could be related to 
a faster rebound of confidence of private households. 
While private consumption and fixed capital formation are on 
a lower path than in other forecasts, our outlook for 
government consumption is higher. According to our model, 
strong countercyclical behaviour will offset the dampening 




























According to the EFN outlook, the increase of working days 
in 2004 is expected to have only a negligible effect on the 
economic performance. This view is confirmed by the 
empirical evidence. For example, growth rates are available 
for both unadjusted and working day adjusted German GDP. 
Over the last 10 years, the series did not deviate by more than 
0.2 percentage points, even in those years where the number 
of working days differed by three. 
Inflation forecasts are similar to those published by the 
Consensus Forecasts. A main feature of our models is that 
they project each price component of the HICP accordingly 
with its corresponding innovations and that the more negative 
recent innovations are mainly concentrated in energy prices. 
Forecast comparison with previous outlooks 
Table 1.5 provides a comparison between the forecast for 
2003 and 2004 with the forecasts in the previous reports and 
with the actual outcome in 2002. In autumn 2002, no EFN 
forecast for 2004 was published. 
For 2003 and 2004, the growth rates of GDP and most 
aggregates have been successively revised downwards, 
except for government consumption.  
The slow evolution of the world economy and the euro 
appreciation have worsened the export prospects. Due to 
multiplier effects, domestic expenditure components were 
adversely hit. 
The inflation forecasts for 2004 are one tenth of percentage 
point lower than in the previous report mainly due to the 
changes in the expectations of service prices. 
Table 1.5  Comparison of autumn forecast with previous outlooks 
  Actual Autumn 2002 Spring 2003 Autumn 2003 
  2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2003 2004 
GDP 0.8 0.9 2.2 1.2 2.1 0.5 1.5 
Private Consumption 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.0 2.0 1.1 1.3 
Government Consumption 2.8 1.7 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.9 2.0 
Fixed Capital Formation -2.7 -1.7 2.3 0.9 4.3 -1.8 1.2 
Exports 1.5 1.7 8.7 3.3 6.3 -0.5 4.0 
Imports -0.3 0.1 8.6 4.0 7.7 1.4 3.9 
Unemployment rate 8.4 8.3 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.0 9.3 
HICP inflation 2.3 2.3 1.8 2.4 1.8 2.1 1.7 
Industrial Production -0.6 -0.2 2.6 0.8 2.0 -0.1 1.4 
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BOX 4: FORECASTING METHODS 
Short term forecasts are derived by means of a quarterly macroeconometric model. 
The model treats the Euro area as a single entity and variables are obtained as Euro area 
aggregates. The underpinning theoretical framework refers to an open economy with 
competitive markets. Agents have been aggregated into the sectors of households, firms, 
government and foreign countries. Within each sector, individuals are assumed to be 
homogeneous. The goods, labour and financial assets markets are included. The latter covers 
money, bonds and foreign exchange. Households and firms maximize individual utilities or 
profits, respectively. Government and foreign countries are broadly exogenous. Due to 
sluggish prices and wages, output and employment are demand driven in the short run and 
determined by the supply side in the long run. Short run imbalances initiate wage and price 
adjustments, leading to interest rate reactions via a Taylor rule. All equations are specified in 
an error correction form. Point forecasts are extended by confidence bands to quantify the 
range of uncertainty around the most likely developments. The model is discussed in more 
detail in the spring 2002 EFN report. 
As an exception, forecasts for the HICP are obtained from a disaggregated monthly 
model for the components of the index, see the spring report for details. This gives a better 
insight into the underlying causes of inflation. Different stochastic trends in the main price 
components (food, energy, non energy industrial goods, and services) require a disaggregated 
framework which is based on leading indicators and non-linear structures. Given the access to 
the components, total inflation is split into core and residual inflation, where the former is 
especially relevant for competition on international markets. In the case of sensitivity 
analysis, the HICP is derived within the model, and regressors include the output gap, import 
prices, unit labour costs and the money stock. The results of this model are also used to 
provide an explanation of the determining factors of the inflation forecast. 
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BOX 5: FORECASTING FISCAL VARIABLES 
In this box we compare alternative procedures for forecasting fiscal variables for the 
largest countries in the Euro area. An important motivation for this exercise comes from the 
recognition that fiscal forecasts are playing an increasing role in macroeconomic policy 
decisions. This has been particularly obvious in the European context where, for example, the 
operating procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact involve reference to forecast values of 
the fiscal deficit and debt at more than one point.  
We consider four different types of forecasts. First, standard ARMA model based 
forecasts, which perform quite well for several European macroeconomic variables, both on a 
country by country basis and at the Euro Area aggregate level. Second, VAR based forecasts, 
since VARs have been often used to model fiscal variables and their interaction with other 
macroeconomic variables. Third, forecasts from small scale structural models containing 
three types of variables: macroeconomic indicators, fiscal policy indicators and monetary 
policy indicators. We consider both national models, along the lines of Favero (2002) who 
used similar models to study the interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities, and a 
larger Euro area model, where the national models are linked up together to take into account 
the implications of the convergence process started by the adoption of the single currency, 
and in particular the presence of a single monetary policy with different fiscal policies. 
Finally, pooled forecasts obtained by taking either the mean or the median of the previous 
three types of forecasts. 
We focus on four key fiscal variables, i.e. government expenditures and receipts, the 
deficit and the government debt, and on three macroeconomic variables, i.e. the output gap, 
inflation and a short term interest rate, since these are important variables to determine the 
evolution of the fiscal aggregates. All data are semi-annual and are extracted from the OECD 
dataset, with details provided in Favero and Marcellino (2003). In the table below we report 
results for one-step and two-step ahead forecasts, that can be used to derive current year and 
year ahead forecasts, using the mean square error (MSE) relative to a random walk forecast as 
the evaluation criterion. 
Six main comments can be made. First, for the macroeconomic variables the ARMA 
forecasts are often the best, with a slightly worse performance at the longer horizon. Second, 
for the fiscal variables the time-series forecasts in general are the most accurate at the shorter 
horizon, while more mixed results are obtained at the longer horizon. Third, the good 
performance of the random walk forecasts emerges also from our analysis, though in general 
it is possible to find a model that outperforms the random walk. Fourth, in general the 
structural models do not yield any substantial forecasting gains, and a similar result holds for 
the OECD forecasts at the shortest horizon. This finding is likely due to the fact that our 
models are not fine-tuned for forecasting, but it is yet another indication that simple time 
series models or pooling often yield the best forecasts. Fifth, substantial uncertainty surrounds 
the forecasts, so that the competing forecasts are seldom statistically different, and the size of 
the average forecast error for the fiscal balance, perhaps the most interesting fiscal variable 
from the policy point of view, is rather large. Finally, these results are robust to the adoption 










expected growth in 
the Euro area, 
Accession countries 
fared fairly well in 
2002 and early 2003 
Against the backdrop of continued weakness in growth in the 
Euro area and other developed markets, the preliminary data 
on economic performance in the EU Accession countries in 
the first half of 2003 are quite positive. The most recent data 
releases seem to suggest that the vast majority of countries in 
Central and Southeastern Europe either grew strongly in the 
first quarter of 2003 or continued to recover gradually from 
the slowdown experienced in 2001 and 2002. While partially 
reflecting statistical base effects of weaker expansion in early 
2002, growth in exports, industrial output, and market 
services surprised on the upside. In fact, despite planned 
downgrades of growth prospects in Western Europe this year, 
we decided to keep our forecasts for 2003 unchanged for 
most of the markets (Hungary being the only exception 
among the larger economies), and even raise them in the case 
of the Baltic States. In most cases, growth in the region has 
been generated by slightly better export performance that 
supported manufacturing output, while domestic demand, 
predominantly private consumption, provided additional 
support. Wherever possible, national governments continued 
to support growth with expansionary fiscal policies. Facing 
rapidly declining inflation, central banks followed suit and 
aggressively lowered interest rates. The combination of those 
policies stimulated private consumption and investment.  
 
Among the largest economies, Poland’s economy is clearly 
coming out of stagnation that characterized the last two years. 
Growth in the second quarter of 2003 accelerated to 3.8% 
year on year, up from the 2.2% growth reported for the fourth 
quarter of 2002 and the first quarter of this year. Although the 
drop in West European demand certainly contributed to 
Poland’s mediocre performance last year (1.4% growth in 
GDP) and in 2001 (1.0% growth), the slowdown in growth, to 
a large extent, was self-inflicted, a result of an unfortunate 
mix of loose fiscal policy and very tight monetary policy. In 
Hungary, GDP grew 3.3% last year and is currently slowing 
down, on the back of negative pull from net exports and 
weaker investment spending and despite a rebound in 
industrial output growth. We have recently downgraded the 
GDP growth for this year to 3.0%. In the case of the Czech 
Republic, revised data show that GDP grew only 2.2% in the 
first half of this year. Other candidates for EU accession in 
Chapter 2 




































2004 also recorded respectable growth rates in 2002 and the 
first half of 2003 with the Baltics leading the way with year-
on-year growth rates exceeding 6.0%. The Baltic States are in 
great shape. GDP growth of 5.6% (Estonia), 5.9% (Latvia), 
and 6.7% (Lithuania) was truly impressive last year, and 
prospects for accession to the European Union in 2004 are 
fuelling substantial inflows of foreign investment, further 
contributing to faster growth in exports. In fact, GDP in 
Lithuania surged by 9.1% year on year in the first quarter of 
this year, as the country’s largest refinery benefited from 
higher prices of refined petroleum products boosting 
production and export sales. Slovakia is in the second year of 
strong economic recovery registering aggregate output 
growth in the 3.5-4.5% range annually. Slovenian GDP 
growth is expected to slow this year below 3.0% mainly due 
to sluggish private consumption. Malta's economic 
performance rebounded weakly in 2002. Malta’s real GDP 
grew 1.0%, compared with a decline of 1.2% a year earlier, 
but significantly below the 1995-2000 average growth of 
4.6%. All sectors of the economy remained stagnant in 2002, 
however, with the only signs of a recovery coming from the 
performance of private and government consumption as well 
as investment in the construction sector. Despite slowing 
down in 2002, the economy of Cyprus still managed to grow 
by 2.0% last year. While the war in Iraq and increased 
geopolitical tensions have hurt the country’s economic 
prospects early in 2003, the quick fall of the Saddam Hussein 
regime and the expected more pronounced recovery in the 
world economy in the remaining months of this year should 
help the Cyprus’ economy pick up speed through the 
remainder of the year, though economic growth should come 
in weaker than initially expected.  
 
In light of weaker external demand, domestic consumption 
picked up the slack in 2002 in early 2003. Most governments 
reacted to the slowdown in economic growth by loosening 
fiscal strings. This trend was particularly visible in Hungary, 
where, partly in anticipation of the parliamentary elections in 
May 2002, the former government offered increases in wages 
to public-sector employees and continued to fund large 
infrastructure projects. This fiscal largesse continued in the 
second half of 2002 as the new Socialist government tried to 
meet some of its pre-election promises. The governments in 
Poland and the Czech Republic have also been reluctant to 
cut budget deficits, although such reductions will be 
necessary in the coming years if Central European countries 
are to meet the Maastricht criteria for EMU entry. The sectors 
pulling performance down relative to the same periods of 
2001 were usually industry and construction. The industrial 
sector has been suffering from slack export demand in key 
markets and, like the construction sector, from slow growth in 
investment spending, as enterprise profits have been 

































that industrial output is gradually recovering this year on the 
back of export growth and steady domestic demand.  
 
Both consumer and producer price inflation staged a major 
decline in the region over the last 18 months. Mainly due to 
rapid declines in prices of food products, delays in more 
aggressive increases in administratively controlled prices, and 
strengthening currencies, inflation reached all-time lows in 
majority of Accession countries either in late 2002 or early 
this year. Among the Central European economies, inflation 
in Hungary and Slovenia remained more stubborn early this 
year, but even there year-on-year consumer price inflation has 
slowly came down. All core inflation indicators have shown 
consistent declines that continued during 2003. Most major 
price fluctuations in the region can be tracked the volatile 
energy and food prices, or changes in administrative prices of 
services. Even in Slovakia, where year-on-year inflation rates 
have grown quite strongly in recent months due to increases 
in taxation and adjustments to administratively controlled 
prices, the core inflation indicators are under control. After 
recessions or sharp declines in growth following the 1998 
Russia crisis, inflation in the Baltic economies remains very 
much under control as well. Producer price inflation has 
fallen even more dramatically, sometimes below Euro area 
rates. In some cases, most notably in the Czech Republic, 
declines in producer prices persisted in 2002 and during the 
first five months of this year, despite large increases in costs 
of fuels and transportation services earlier this year.  
The inflationary pressures in the EU Accession countries 
have been substantially reduced in the last several months, 
and the risk of a major resurgence in inflation is rather limited 
in the short to medium term. In light of the global 
disinflationary environment and weak growth, most of the 
governments and central banks in Emerging Europe should 
have no problem keeping inflation at or close to the current 
low levels. This is not to say that headline inflation will not 
rise in some countries. Wage pressures could be much greater 
in this region than in the Euro area, particularly in the 
medium term as citizens in the Accession countries demand 
purchasing power parity closer to that of their new 
compatriots. Also, the extraordinary decline in food prices in 
2001 for most of these countries due to bumper harvests will 
not likely be repeated going forward. Performance on 
inflation is projected to be more mixed, coming off 
exceptional years in 2001 and 2002 that saw consumer and 
producer price inflation plummeting to record lows. Bumper 
harvests and relatively strong currencies put downward 
pressure on domestic prices last year. In many countries in 
the region, consumer prices are already below Euro area 
levels. Producer prices contracted in Central Europe in 2002 
and are rebounding only gradually in early 2003. With the 
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a potential threat in the short run, central banks are quite 
relaxed about the inflationary outlook for the rest of 2003. In 
countries where we forecast slightly higher inflation this year, 
price growth will be driven by one-off increases in taxes and 
administratively controlled prices of utilities. Core inflation 
indicators are likely to remain stable or increase only 
modestly.  
 
The monetary authorities started 2003 on a considerably more 
cautious note. Most of the central banks anticipated that after 
the stellar performance on inflation in 2002, the situation 
would likely reverse during this year. As a result, they were 
reluctant to ease monetary conditions too aggressively to 
avoid having to hike rates later in the year. Consistency in 
implementing interest rates policies was considered crucial in 
providing investors with a transparent environment and in 
establishing credibility by independent central banks. This 
consistency was successfully applied in all countries, with the 
sole exception of Hungary, were questionable decisions on 
exchange rate policy led to large fluctuations in interest rate 
in January-June 2003. Among the largest economies, only 
Poland proceeded with gradual but consistent interest rate 
cuts during the first six months of this year, reducing them by 
25 basis points each month for a cumulative 150 basis points 
since the end of 2002. Given high real rates at the outset of 
the year and further declines in inflation, these cuts did little 
to loosen the monetary conditions. Real rates in Poland still 
remain at close to 4%, the second highest level in the region 
after Hungary, and there is clearly more room for future cuts. 
The monetary authorities in the Czech Republic decided to 
cut the rates three times, by 25 basis points each time, in 
unexpected moves in January, June and July. The Czech 
National Bank has originally considered reducing rates in 
early June to adjust them to ECB levels, but the market 
uncertainty surrounding the recent developments in Hungary 
resulted in a slight delay in the CNB’s decision. The July cut 
surprised almost everybody and brought the Czech rates 
down to ECB levels. In light of still fragile situation in the 
external accounts and the rapid increase in headline consumer 
price inflation as a result of the introduction of large increases 
in VAT tax this year, the Slovak National Bank opted for 
keeping the rates unchanged and we expect this policy to 
continue in the near term. While the appreciation pressures on 
local currencies have moderated due to uncertainty 
surrounding the conflict in Iraq earlier in the year, along with 
domestic political instability in Poland and the Czech 
Republic as of late, the upward pressures could possibly 
return later in 2003, providing central banks with further 
arguments to cut rates.  
 
Against the background of consistent policies elsewhere in 
the region, the Hungarian case clearly stands out. In mid-
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January 2003, with the forint continuing to strengthen, the 
Hungarian National Bank started to intervene heavily in the 
foreign exchange market, buying an estimated 4 billion euro 
in a series of interventions. When the interventions did not 
weaken the currency sufficiently to stay away from the top 
end of the 15% fluctuation band, the NBH cut its base two-
week deposit rate in two moves over January 15 and 16, 
lowering it cumulatively by 200 basis points from 8.5% to 
6.5%. The bank seemed determined to defend the current 
fluctuation band at any cost. The bank also restricted the 
availability of the two-week deposit facility to 100 billion 
forints during the next session, and widened the overnight 
rate corridor to 3.5–9.0%. While the NBH scored a bid 
victory over the “speculators,” and booked a nice profit when 
it gradually sold the euros from the reserves, the damage done 
to the bank’s credibility was difficult to quantify. The bank 
then kept the interest rate stable for five months, contributing 
to the stabilization of the foreign exchange markets. 
Unfortunately, this policy was again crushed by the effects of 
the bank’s unexpected decision to devalue the forint’s parity 
rate on June 4, 2003 at the insistence of the government. Over 
the next several days, the forint exhibited continued 
weakness, forcing the NBH to hike its two-week deposit 
interest rate by a cumulative 300 basis points on June 11 and 
June 19: from 6.50% to 9.50%. Even that move was not 
sufficient to prop up the forint, however. The short-term 
interest rate differential against the European Central Bank 
policy rate is now at 750 basis point, by far the highest in the 
region. The Hungarian case is further proof of how delicate is 
the balance between using interest rates to keep interest rates 
under control, while at the same time attempting to keep local 
currencies for appreciating excessively. 
  
The period of radical cuts in interest rates in Central Europe 
is clearly over. While real interest rates in several countries, 
most notably Poland and Hungary, are still relatively high, 
the downward adjustments to nominal interest rates this year 
will be considerably more moderate than in the past. 
Gradualism and moderation are in fashion, as local monetary 
authorities want to avoid volatility in any form, as they 
slowly prepare for the accession to the European and 
Monetary Union. With inflation picking up somewhat later 
this year in almost all countries in the region, and fiscal 
deficits staying well above set targets for 2003 and 2004, 
central bankers will need to undertake a balancing act 
between providing support to investment activity and 
safeguarding the achievements in fighting inflation. The 
convergence in interest rates, particularly at the longer end of 
the curve, should continue without major disruptions.  
The state of public finances of four largest Central European 
candidates for EU membership—Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia—has deteriorated considerably over 
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the last two years. The reasons for the widening of state and 
consolidated budget deficits has differed among the countries. 
Some of the excessive increases in expenditures stemmed 
from outlays related to the implementation of pension, health 
care, and educational reforms. The new members of NATO 
also found that increased security comes at a cost, as the 
alliance required upgrades to military installations and 
equipment. Furthermore, the economic slowdown across the 
region that hit in late 2001 and early 2002 cut tax revenues 
below expectations and resulted in short-term liquidity 
problems for public finances. Finally, the governments in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic introduced extensive fiscal 
packages to stimulate their struggling economies through 
large-scale investments and spending programs.  
 
A snapshot of the current situation is not very rosy. In Poland, 
the state budget deficit and the consolidated public sector 
deficit are hovering around 5.0-5.5% of GDP, although both 
measures of fiscal deficits have been reduced to below 3.0% 
of GDP in past years. The detailed plan to reform Polish 
public finances is currently under consideration by the 
government. The cabinet will have to identify savings on the 
expenditure side to avoid a negative net effect of new 
expenditures related to Poland’s accession in 2004. Even with 
the implementation of the plan, that now is questionable due 
to changed political situation in the country (SLD-UP 
governing coalition is now a parliamentary minority), the 
nominal budget deficits are to remain relatively large in 
2004–05. Using the ESA-95 methodology and including the 
flows between the budget and private pension funds, Polish 
consolidated budget deficit can possibly be reduced to around 
3.0% by 2007. In Hungary, the pre-election fiscal largesse of 
the former Fidesz government and the initial spending by the 
new Socialist government drove the general budget deficit 
out of proportion. Most recently, the general budget deficit in 
2002 amounted to 1,612 billion forints—more than three 
times the size of the deficit in the corresponding period last 
year, double the annual target and 9.2% of GDP according to 
the ESA-95 methodology. The Hungarian government 
approved its medium-term economic program that was 
presented to the European Commission on August 15, 2002, 
in time for the periodic review of the Accession countries in 
September. The document states that the cabinet will aim to 
cut the general government budget deficit to 4.5% of GDP, 
by another 1.5% of GDP in 2004 and an annual 0.5 
percentage point in the later years in order to ensure a smooth 
entry into the EMU by 2007. In light of the most recent 
budget numbers, the assumptions of the plan have to be put in 
question.  
 
In the Czech Republic, the Czech Finance Ministry now 
appears to realize the need to deal with the country’s growing 
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fiscal deficits. However, even in the Finance Ministry’s most 
optimistic scenario, revealed on December 16, 2003, the 
consolidated budget deficit would only be cut to 3.7% of 
GDP by 2006, meaning that the Czech Republic remains the 
only accession country that is not currently aiming to meet 
the Maastricht criteria for admission to the EMU by 2006. 
The pessimistic scenario would provide for a deficit of 4.9% 
of GDP in that year.  
 
The Slovak Parliament approved the 2003 state budget on 
December 11, with a planned deficit of 56.0 billion koruna, or 
4.85% of projected GDP. State budget revenues are projected 
at 235.4 billion koruna, up from a targeted 219.9 billion 
koruna in 2002. The budget sets expenditures at 291.4 billion 
koruna, including 10.7 billion koruna linked to bank 
restructuring. In its revised medium-term financial outlook, 
published on November 22, the Finance Ministry announced 
plans to lower the public finance deficit to 3.3% of GDP by 
2005. In that year, GDP growth is projected to reach 5.1%, 
with average inflation of 4.9%. The consolidated public debt 
is forecast to grow to 553 billion koruna by 2005, or 39.1% of 
GDP, up from an estimated 385 billion koruna (36.2% of 
GDP) in 2002. According to ESA 95 methodology, the public 
finance deficit should fall from an estimated 7.8% of GDP in 
2002 to 5.0% in 2003 and 3.8% in 2004. That will require a 
reduction in the debt of health insurance companies, as well 
as improved collection of tax and customs arrears. Moreover, 
it will also depend on whether privatisation proceeds are used 
to repay public debt. 
 
Whereas external imbalances are essentially under control in 
Poland and the Czech Republic (in the latter case, the current 
account deficit, although relatively high as percentage of 
GDP, is fully financed by foreign direct investment flows). 
On the other hand, the current account deficits in Hungary, 
Slovakia and some Baltic States widened rapidly, putting 
central banks on alert to keep domestic demand under 
control. Foreign direct investment and portfolio investment 
continue to flow to the EU candidate countries, although at a 
slower pace, attracted by relatively stable currencies and the 
projected convergence of local interest rates to Euro area 
levels.  
 
Looking forward to the remainder of 2003, we projects that 
the modest average growth in EU accession economies in 
2002 will pick up steam some steam this year. The recovery 
this year will be gradual.  
 
 30
BOX 1: EARLY SIGNALS OF FINANCIAL MARKET CRISES 
The signals approach was proposed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) as a early 
warning system to a financial crisis. The basic idea is to analyse the behaviour of 
macroeconomic variables during tranquil and crisis periods. In order to assess whether the 
signal of a variable heralds a crisis looming or whether it predicts more settled times, a 
threshold has to be determined. It serves as a critical cut-off value that is the borderline 
between a sustainable and an unsustainable development. To find the threshold a grid search 
is provided. In particular, a balance has to be struck between setting the threshold too high 
and missing too many crises or setting it too low, indicating too many crises (false alarms). A 
variable with a noise-to-signal ratio (NTS-ratio) of less than 1 points to a good indicator as it 
is issuing more good than bad signals while the reverse is true for a NTS-ratio of greater 
than 1. 
Thresholds for the Central and Eastern European transition countries are taken from 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) which were calculated for a sample of 20 countries from Western 
Europe, Asia, and Latin America, see Brüggemann and Linne (2002). This procedure has the 
advantage that it provides a real test of the prognostic quality of the signals approach as an 
early warning system as the thresholds are generated out-of-sample. 
The best indicators are the Real Exchange Rate vs. the US-Dollar (NTS ratio: 0.15), 
the Budget Deficit (0.38), the World Interest Rate (0.39), and Foreign Debt (0.42). Only two 
variables issue more bad signals than good ones: Imports (1.10), and the Ratio of Lending 
Rate to Deposit Rate (1.50). The threshold for each indicator is applied to the country-specific 
distribution of an indicator. In other words, the relative threshold is the same for an indicator 
across countries, but the absolute value is different. For instance, the NTS-ratio for Exports is 
minimised at the 44th percentile of the empirical distribution. This means for Hungary that 
Exports are issuing signals if the annual decline is stronger than 2 %, while for Romania this 
is already the case at a decrease of more than 0.7 %. 
The Accession countries were strongly affected by the economic slowdown in 
Western Europe in the years 2001 and 2002, as many of the indicators crossed their respective 
thresholds. The situation started to improve in the second half of 2002 as the economic 
activity in Western Europe started to recover. In particular, as industrial production and 
exports started picking up again, these indicators often left the critical area and did not exhibit 
any further violations of their thresholds. Little signalling activity came from the real 
exchange rate versus the Euro, which reflects the fact that inflation in the Accession countries 
is converging to the Eurozone level. In addition, strong domestic demand helped to keep the 
internal indicators like changes in the money supply and bank deposits at a subdued signalling 
level. Also, the monetary indicators point to a further reduction in the inflation rate for most 
countries for the second half of 2003. The exception being Hungary where the budget deficit 
is likely to stimulate domestic demand, which makes a reduction in the inflation rate harder. 
Literature:  
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The developments in the area of public finance and the need to 
sharply reduce budget deficits in the next several years 
constitute by far the biggest challenge for Accession countries. 
This challenge is of particular importance for the largest 
economies in the group, as in their case, the build-up in 
government spending, especially the last two years, resulted in 
a public finance position that is not sustainable in the longer 
term. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (or CE-3) were 
by far the furthest from meeting the Maastricht criterion for 
fiscal budget deficit levels (with the exception of Malta). Some 
of the excessive increases in expenditures stemmed from 
outlays related to the implementation of pension, health care, 
and educational reforms. In addition, the economic slowdown 
across the region that hit in late 2001 and early 2002 kept tax 
revenues below expectations and resulted in short-term 
liquidity problems. Finally, the governments in Hungary and 
the Czech Republic introduced extensive fiscal packages to 
stimulate their struggling economies through large-scale 
investment and current spending programs.  
 
Public Finance in the Pre-Accession Economic 
Programs  
 
One inherent weakness of public finance planning in Central 
Europe relates to its short-term horizon. Some attempts at 
providing a more extended view of the budgetary policy 
making process have been undertaken, but only quite recently. 
It appears that the safest way to reduce expenditures gradually 
and without a dampening of economic growth is the 
implementation of a system of medium-term expenditure 
ceilings. Such ceilings, usually applied for periods of between 
three and five years, apply to spending by all branches of the 
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down to 4% in 
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Table 3.1.  Poland - Fiscal Developments  (Central government budget, percentage of GDP) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Budget revenues 42.1 43.1 42.9 42.2 42.1 
Budget expenditures 45.9 47.2 47.9 46.2 45.5 
Deficit (ESA-95) -3.8 -4.1 -5.0 -4.0 -3.4 
Deficit (Current Polish Methodology) -6.0 -6.1 -5.8 -4.8 -4.0 
Source:  Ministry of Finance: Pre-Accession Economic Program of Poland, August 2003 
transparent medium-term budget plan and clear planning
guidelines makes forecasting budget deficits in CE-3 very 
difficult. Information on the medium-term public finance plans 
is included in the Pre-Accession Economic Program filed by 
candidate countries with the European Commission. The 
picture transpiring from these plans is not very promising. 
While Hungary is planning to undertake a massive reduction in 
government spending to bring the deficit down from 9.2% of 
GDP in 2002 to just under 3.0% of GDP in 2006, the other two 
countries seem to take a much more liberal approach to budget 
expenditure management. As such, the target date of meeting 
the 3.0% of GDP level is seriously postponed from the original 
plans, to 2007 in Poland and 2008 or even 2009 in the Czech 
Republic. 
 
The Polish government now seems resigned to the fact that the 
public finance deficit is likely to expand substantially in 2004 
before accelerating economic growth permits a reduction in the 
gap in the subsequent years. Calculated according to the ESA-
95 methodology, the public finance gap is set to rise to 5.0% in 
2004 before declining gradually to 4.0% in 2005 and below 
3.4% of GDP in 2006. While the rise in 2004 reflects the 
unwillingness of the government to cut expenditures already 
next year, the forecast for the subsequent years is even more 
questionable. First, the assumed growth of 5.0% in both 2004 
and 2005 and 5.6% in 2006 exceeds even the most optimistic 
consensus forecasts. Second, the first year of planned reduction 
falls in 2005, an election year. The plan provides little 
information in terms of identification of areas where cuts or 
realignments will be introduced.  
In its pre-accession program the Czech Republic government 
presented a general government deficit forecast which moves 
from 7.6% in 2003 to 4% in 2006. However, the government 
openly admits that the lack of any sensible reform in the 
nearest future may raise the general budget deficit to 8-9% of 
GDP during 2004-2006. This is mostly due to a persistent 
tendency for expenditures to grow in real terms. The increases 
in general expenditure levels are mostly due to growing social 
expenditures. This expenditure is essentially crowding out all 
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Table 3.2.  Czech Republic -- Fiscal Deficits (ESA-95, general government, percentage of 
GDP) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
General government deficit -6.7 -7.6 -5.9 -4.8 -4.0 
Central government deficit -6.7 -7.3 -5.3 -4.3 -3.6 
Local government deficit 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 
Social security funds -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source:  Pre-Accession Economic Program, August 2003 
very gradual compared to those suggested in Hungary and even 
Poland. The reform if consists of a combination of measures on 
both the revenue and the expenditure sides of the general 
government budgets including a reform of the pension system 
as well as cutting sickness benefits. 
The Hungarian government stated the goal of joining the Euro 
at the earliest possible date, and the fulfilment of the 
convergence criteria has high priority on its agenda. The 
government forecasts that following a 4.8% of GDP budget 
deficit in 2003, the deficit would be then cut by 1 percentage 
point of GDP in each of the subsequent two years, thus 
dropping to 2.8% of GDP in 2005. It will be then reduced to
2.5% in 2006. The Hungarian government is ready to admit 
that an overshooting of this year’s target is likely. The 
excessive spending might be combined with an unexpected 
reduction in tax revenues not only in 2003, but also next year. 
According to the plan, if the deficit in 2004 runs the risk of 




While the government scenarios could be described as 
relatively optimistic, at least three other scenarios can be 
developed.  
 
The “Official” Scenario  
Among the three government baseline scenarios, the Hungarian 
approach is clearly the most radical in terms of timing and 
severity of expenditure cuts in the first several years. It is also 
the plan that brings the deficit to target levels of below 3.0% of 
GDP in the shortest amount of time. On the other hand, the 
Czech government’s baseline seems overly pessimistic with 
respect to growth prospects for the Czech economy. This does 
not change the opinion, however, that the fiscal problems in 
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Table 3.3.  Hungary -- Fiscal Developments  (General government, percentage of GDP) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Budget revenues* 44.5 43.0 44.5 44-44.5 43.5 
Budget expenditures* 53.7 47.8 48.3 47.0 46.0 
Deficit 9.2 4.8 3.8 2.8 2.5 
* of which: EU transfers 0.2 0.4 0.5-1.0 1.0 1.0 
Source:  Pre-Accession Economic Program of Hungary, August 2003 
The “Baseline” Scenario  
This scenario reflects our current assessment of the economic 
outlook for the CE-3 economies and our view of the most 
likely scenario of fiscal adjustments in the coming years. This 
scenario is de facto roughly based on similar assumptions as 
those used by the government scenario, but is stripped of the 
overly optimistic assumption as to the governments’ ability to 
reduce deficit spending in the current political and social 
environment. It also reflects different growth and inflation 
trends that are assumed in our forecasts.  
 
The “Expansion/Austerity” Scenario  
This hypothetical scenario (with assumed probability of no 
more than 10%) incorporates higher spending in the initial 
period of the forecast. The resulting overshooting of the deficit 
target, when compared with the official scenario, is then 
“corrected” in the years 2005-2006 by application of very 
restrictive spending control policies that freeze most of the 
expenditure categories at the previous year’s real levels.  
 
The “Fiscal Prudence” Scenario  
This most desirable approach to fiscal management is also the 
least likely in terms of implementation. It requires a disciplined 
approach to reforms, setting up a system of medium-term limits 
on certain expenditures and an almost complete elimination of 
other categories of expenditures by incorporation of off-
budgetary funds into the main budget, a program of annual 
savings on the ministerial level with respect to variable 
expenditures. Application of a combination of increased taxes 
on VAT and excise taxes is matched with a more liberal 
application of tax cuts for individuals and businesses.  
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POLAND - Fiscal Scenarios 2003 2004 2005 2006 
OFFICIAL SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.0 5.0 5.0 5.6 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -4.1 -5.0 -4.0 -3.4 
     
BASELINE     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.0 3.9 4.3 4.0 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -4.1 -5.5 -4.5 -4.0 
     
EXPANSION/AUSTERITY SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.0 3.9 4.3 3.8 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -4.1 -5.8 -4.8 -3.8 
     
FISCAL PRUDENCE SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.0 3.9 4.4 4.2 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -4.1 -5.1 -4.5 -3.8 
==================================================================== 
CZECH REPUBLIC - Fiscal scenarios 2003 2004 2005 2006 
OFFICIAL SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -7.6 -5.9 -4.8 -4.0 
     
BASELINE     
GDP (annual growth in %) 2.5 3.5 4.1 4.4 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -8.3 -5.8 -4.6 -4.0 
     
EXPANSION/AUSTERITY SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 2.5 3.5 4.1 3.8 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -8.3 -6.1 -4.8 -3.8 
     
FISCAL PRUDENCE SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 2.5 3.5 4.1 4.4 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -8.0 -5.4 -4.5 -3.8 
==================================================================== 
HUNGARY - Fiscal scenarios 2003 2004 2005 2006 
OFFICIAL SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.5 3.5 4.0-4.5 4.5-5.0 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -4.8 -3.8 -2.8 -2.5 
     
BASELINE     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.2 3.9 4.0 4.0 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -5.2 -4.4 -4.0 -3.8 
     
EXPANSION/AUSTERITY SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.2 3.9 4.0 3.6 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -5.4 -5.1 -4.4 -3.8 
     
FISCAL PRUDENCE SCENARIO     
GDP (annual growth in %) 3.2 3.9 4.1 4.0 
General budget balance (% of GDP) -5.2 -4.3 -3.2 -3.0 
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BOX 1: EMERGING EUROPE COUNTRIES - MODEL DESCRIPTION 
We use discrete, general equilibrium growth models for all Accession countries 
from the region. GDP is forecast by projecting and then summing net output from the various 
key economic sectors separately (industry, agriculture, services, construction, trade, etc.).  
Growth in value-added in industry is extrapolated from monthly output data to forecast 
industrial output for the upcoming 24 months. Forecasts for the ensuing few years of growth 
are based on a recovery scenario.  Because large shares of the labour force and capital stock 
are underutilised at this point due to the transition, industrial output growth can be very strong 
in the initial years of the recovery without much additional investment as idle assets are re-
employed.  After industrial output approaches previous peaks, the industrial sector becomes 
more "normal."  Time series and cross-country analysis are employed to project rates of 
growth in industry, services, and agriculture as well as to project structural changes in the 
economies. Activity in the trade sector is driven by personal consumption.  The output of the 
construction sector is driven by changes in gross investment in fixed capital.  
Aggregate demand is projected by taking the difference between forecast GDP and 
the current account. Investment within aggregate demand is forecasted using historical and 
comparative statistics on the share of investment in GDP in the country itself and in Western 
Europe to establish an equilibrium share of investment in GDP.  Because in some countries, 
such as Russia, investment is currently at fairly low levels by historical or comparative 
measures, investment levels need to rise in these countries to reach the equilibrium level.  A 
lagged adjustment model is used to increase the share of investment toward the equilibrium 
rate.  Government consumption is forecast based on policies toward government spending. In 
general, spending on government services has been rising more slowly than personal 
consumption during the transition; policy statements indicate this trend will continue.  
Personal consumption is the residual category of aggregate demand, after investment and 
government consumption are specified.  The forecast for personal consumption drives the 
forecast for retail sales. Labour productivity growth determines changes in real wages. 
A separate module is used to forecast trade flows.  In these models, export growth is 
driven by projected demand growth in key export markets, such as the EU, as well as overall 
growth in world demand.  In addition to export volumes, these models also explicitly 
incorporate major changes in world commodity prices into the forecasts of overall trade 
flows.  Import demand is determined by changes in aggregate output subject to a financing 
constraint. Import demand, in turn, generates current account balances, which generate 
changes in gross and net debt and hence future debt servicing. 
Inflation is projected on the basis of exchange rate policy, fiscal and monetary 
policy, and a trend rate, which reflects inflationary expectations.  The latter are assumed to be 
partially adaptive, i.e., expectations of future inflation within a country is, in part, driven by 
the experience of the recent past.  Exchange rate policy in most of these countries is directed 
toward eventually stabilizing the exchange rate around the euro or dollar.  However, the 
ability of the central banks to achieve this policy goal is determined by monetary policy and 
the behaviour of the current account.  Monetary policy, in turn, is tightly constrained by fiscal 
policy. Current commitments and past performance drive our assumptions concerning fiscal 
policy. 
The U.S. Bureau of the Census periodically projects population growth for most of 
the countries of the world by gender and age.  Our demographic forecasts were based on these 
projections.  Unfortunately, the U.S. Census forecasts are not always based on the most recent 
country data.  Consequently, we needed to adjust the U.S. Census figures for the more 
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In this paper, we apply the business cycle dating algorithms 
developed for, and reported on, in a previous report (that of 
Autumn, 2002) of the European Forecasting Network, to data 
for the Accession countries (specifically, for the eight 
countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and Lithuania). 
An immediate difference, in dealing with these countries as 
opposed to those of the Euro area, to which the dating 
algorithms were applied in the earlier report, is that the 
available data sample is comparatively short and is marked at 
its beginning by a structural break as the countries concerned 
emerged from their “transition recession”.  In many cases the 
recovery from this transition, when it came, proved to lead onto 
a phase of speedy and uninterrupted growth.   This makes the 
phenomenon of the classical cycle, in which peaks are 
succeeded by absolute declines in activity, of comparatively 
little interest, especially where economic activity is identified 
with GDP, the availability of which is less than that of 
industrial production.  
 
For this reason the paper concerns itself a good deal with 
industrial production data.  An important technical feature of 
the paper is the modelling that is undertaken to take care of the 
seasonal behaviour of these series, which are available at a 
monthly frequency. The modelling follows a variant of the 
“classical” structural model according to which a time series 
may be viewed as the sum of a trend (including a cyclical 
component), a seasonal component and calendar effects.  In the 
case of the accession countries effecting this decomposition is 
complicated by continuing structural change. After identifying 
and removing the seasonal component the dating algorithm is 
then applied to the deseasonalised industrial production series 
to yield a chronology of the classical cycle. 
Industrial production data are not only available for a longer 
period than the GDP series, but are also more cyclical. In 
contrast to the single (or no) classical cycles recorded on GDP 
data, three peaks and troughs are now revealed for the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland and as many as four 
for Slovenia and Latvia over the period (respectively) from 
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1989 to 2002 and from 1980 to 2002.  Data availability for 
Estonia and Lithuania is less extensive and only one complete 
cycle (trough to trough) is identified for these two countries in 
the period from 1995 to 2002.  The corresponding “stylised 
facts” are not dissimilar to those for the Euro area average 
(taken over the period since 1993) – for example, the average 
time spent in expansion, at 77% of the whole period, is a bit 
less than that of the Euro area (82%), but the loss of output 
sustained in recession is larger and there is a considerable 
dispersion of experience among the enlargement countries (as 
there is among the Euro area countries).  In particular, the 
Baltic States seem to have sustained larger output losses as 
well as more time spent in recession. A contribution of the 
techniques used to deseasonalise the data is to permit some 
examination of the uncertainty that should be associated with 
the identification of turning points purely on grounds of doubt 
about the seasonal adjustment. 
 
Given the short data span and the structural change that the 
countries have experienced, deviation cycles seem likely to be 
of more interest than the classical cycle – though, clearly, not 
easy to identify with certainty. Here the deviation cycles are 
identified by applying the dating algorithm to the output gap, 
where the output gap is obtained by applying the well-known 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, following the example set in earlier 
work on the Euro-Area business cycle. Both GDP (Figure 1) 
and industrial production data (Figure 2) are used, the greater 
availability of the latter making for a stronger emphasis on 
results achieved by using these series.  Comparison with the 
Euro area as a whole (and with Germany, Austria and Italy 
separately) highlights the fact that the cycle in the enlargement 
countries has a larger amplitude.  
 
The synchronicity of business cycles among the enlargement 
countries is examined by using the tools of cross-correlation 
coefficients and concordance indices. The latter are applicable 
where the cycle is identified to the point of the phase of the 
cycle (expansion, recession), without there necessarily being a 
continuous series of data representing the cyclical deviate to 
which to apply a correlation measure. In the exploration of 
synchronization data for the Euro area and for Germany, 
Austria and Italy are again involved. Focusing on the cross-
correlation coefficients measured on the deviation cycle from 
1993 to 2002, the main findings are that there is quite a high 
correlation between the Baltic States (as well as between them 
and the Czech Republic), between the limited set of Euro area
countries considered and, as well, between Hungary and 
Poland separately and the Euro area countries.  The 






Figure 4.1. Quarterly GDP – Deviation Cycles 
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Figure 4.2. Monthly Industrial Production – Deviation Cycles 
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A particular interest in business cycle synchronization arises 
from the concerns of optimal currency area (OCA) theory in 
relation to the acceptability of a single monetary policy to the 
members of a currency union.  Given the salience of this issue 
in relation to the enlargement countries, for which the “acquis 
communataire” specifies a move in the direction of 
participation in the EMU, the paper supplements the 
examination of synchronization in two ways.  First, it 
introduces a focus on recent developments by computing 
weighted rolling window correlations and, second, it makes a 
comparison with the degree of convergence attained between 
previous groups of “enlargement” countries and the then 
existing core. There are four previous enlargements in this 
exercise – the first involving the UK, Denmark and Ireland (in 
1973), the second involving Greece (in 1981), the third the 
Iberian countries, Spain and Portugal (in 1986) and the fourth 
the enlargement to bring in Austria, Sweden and Finland (in 
1995). What emerges from this type of comparison is that the 
present enlargement – with the exceptions of Poland, Hungary 
and Slovenia - offers a lower degree of convergence (lower 
correlations) than was available in previous enlargements. 
 
The prospect of application to participate in EMU is of course 
not an immediate one, and we conclude by noting that other 
traditional (and newer) OCA criteria are well-fulfilled in the 
case of the current Accession countries – most notably the 
criterion pertaining to trade (where higher trade is a positive 
indicator for monetary union) and monetary stability (where 
the prospect of joining a block with higher credibility and 
reputation is positive).   This issue is examined in another 
chapter of the report.  
 
A final note of caution is also imparted in relation to the 
interpretation of the business cycle evidence in the light of the 
countries’ short post-transition history and their heady 





































would be useful 







academic work  
has been done 
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of historical 
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During the last years, different studies have focused on the 
effects of the accession of Central and Eastern European 
Countries to the European Monetary Union. Nowadays, 
accession countries have no choice: once they are part of the 
European Union, their goal is to join the euro. In fact, after they 
accede to the EU in 2004, they will have to consider their 
timetables for joining the Monetary Union and they will likely 
be participating in ERM II as soon as possible. This period will 
be a time of high vulnerability to financial instability. As they 
will have only limited exchange rate flexibility in a context of 
full capital mobility, they may experience substantial capital 
outflows that can seriously damage the dynamics of their 
integration in the European Union. Recent works by Begg et al. 
(2003), Eichengren (2003) and Eichengreen et al. (2003), 
among others, have considered this issue.  
An early adoption of the euro would be also associated with the 
loss of autonomous monetary policy, whose costs depend to a 
certain extent on the similarity between business cycles in the 
Euro area and acceding countries, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Only a few studies have considered this issue. One of 
the reasons may relay on the shortage and instability of 
economic data-series in accession countries. In fact, as Fidrmuc 
(2001) states, some of these studies review periods of seven 
years or less, implying that only a single business cycle is 
covered by the available data when the available time period 
needed to establish such synchronization should be higher to 
provide reliable results. On the other hand, the euro can be 
expected to yield substantial gains over a longer horizon. 
In this chapter, we focus on a partial analysis of the problems 
that Accession countries are facing in their road to the 
Monetary Union. In particular, the objective of this chapter is 
to assess if the recent economic evolution of these countries 
have put them in a better or a worst position to join the euro. In 
this sense, it extends previous works in four directions. First, it 
uses longer time series, In fact, the availability of data for the 
period 2000-2002 provides useful information to test if the 
slowdown of the EU economy has changed the similarity of 
business cycles between countries in the Euro area and the 
Chapter 5 
Exchange Rate and Economic Shocks in Accession 
Countries 
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accession countries. Second, it compares the most recent 
evolution of accession countries with the situation of Euro area
countries in the years before the currency unification and with 
the situation of the three European Union countries that have 
not joined the Monetary Union: Denmark, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. Special attention is also paid to the evolution 
of country groups. Third, three different structural VAR 
models are applied in order to check the sensibility of the 
results to the considered econometric methodology. And, last, 
it also tries to shed some light on whether the symmetry of 
shocks has increased over time.  
As a starting point, it is important to highlight that nowadays 
accession countries use different exchange rate regimes, nearly 
covering the whole spectrum from fixed exchange rates to free 
floating. In fact, in the early nineties, at the beginning of their 
transition period they opted for different exchange rate regimes 
(see table 1). Although most of them chose some kind of fixed 
arrangement, others like Slovenia opted for more flexible 
solutions. During the following years, most of them have 
moved towards more flexible exchange rate arrangements. For 
example, the Czech Republic and Poland have fully flexible 
exchange rates. However, this fact points to a certain 
contradiction, as these movements are just in the opposite 
direction than the supposed entry into the euro.  
In this context, a first possibility to assess the position of the 
accession countries1 to join the euro consists in analysing the 
evolution of their exchange rate variability in their transition 
towards the euro (this line of reasoning would be related with 
the Maastricht criteria regarding exchange rates). With this 
aim, we have calculated the standard deviation of the growth 
rate of the monthly exchange rate between each country and 
the Euro area. According to the results, the countries with the 
lowest levels of volatility are Estonia and Slovenia while the 
ones with the highest levels of volatility are the Czech 
Republic and Poland. Of course, these results are clearly 
related to their different exchange rate systems. But, is this 
volatility too high? In order to establish a benchmark, we have 
also calculated the values of the exchange rate variability 
against the euro for Euro area countries2 between 1985 and 
1998 and for Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom for 
two different periods: 1985-1998 and 1994-2002 2. The results 
show that, as a group, Euro area countries have a higher 
volatility than non Monetary Union countries for the same 
period and than Euro area countries during the years before the 
adoption of the euro. But, however, the values for some of the 
individual accession countries were not far away from the 
values of some Euro area countries such as Italy or Finland 
1 Malta and Cyprus are not included in the analysis due to data 
restrictions. 
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Table 5.1. Official exchange rate regimes since 1994 
Czech Republic Estonia 
1994-1996 Basket Peg 
65% DEM, 35% USD 
Band +- 0.5% 
1992 -  Currency board 
Ecu/Euro 
1996-1997 Basket Peg 
65% DEM, 35% USD 
Band +- 7.5% 
  
1997-2001 Managed float   
2001- Free float   
 
Hungary Latvia 
1994-1996 Crawling peg 
70% ECU, 30% USD 
Band +-2.25% 
1994- Fixed Peg 
SDR* 
Band +-1% 
1997-1999 Crawling peg 
70% DEM, 30% USD 
Band +-2.25% 
  










1994-2002 Currency board 
USD 
1994-1995 Crawling peg 
45% USD, 35% DEM,  
10% GBP, % FF, 5% SF 
Band +-1% 
2002- Currency board 
Euro 
1995-1998 Crawling peg 
45% USD, 35% DEM,  
10% GBP, % FF, 5% SF 
Band +-7% 
  1998-1999 Crawling peg 
45% USD, 35% DEM,  
10% GBP, % FF, 5% SF 
Band +-10% 
  1999-2000 Crawling peg 
45% USD, 55% EUR 
Band +-7% 
  2000- Free float 
 
Slovenia Slovak Republic 
1994- Managed Floating 1994-1996 Basket peg 
60% DEM, 40% USD 
Band +-1,5% 
  1997-1998 Basket peg 
60% DEM, 40% USD 
Band +-7% 












































(although it is important to take into account the effects of the 
speculative attacks of 1992-1995 for some Accession 
countries). Moreover, if we look at the evolution of the 
exchange rate volatility during the last years, in general, it has 
decreased. This reduction has been more relevant in Slovenia 
and Hungary, but also in the Czech Republic, where the 
exchange rate system has changed from fixed to free floating. 
Summarising, not all the Accession countries are in the same 
position in their transition from their exchange rates systems 
towards the euro and although some of them have moved 
towards more flexible exchange rate arrangements (which is in 
part a certain contradiction), the exchange rate volatility 
towards the euro has not increased substantially. In any case, it 
is important to take into account that until they join the EU, 
there are no restrictions on the choice of the exchange rate 
regime although once they enter, they will not be given the 
possibility to opt-out. For this reason, a key issue during the 
next months is to design an effective strategy for accession 
countries in their road to Monetary Union taking into account 
the peculiarities of each of these countries. However, it is also 
important to consider that ERM-II may be fully compatible 
with most current exchange rate regimes, from currency boards 
to relatively wide bands. The problem is that, as a fixed but 
adjustable regime, the transition period will be a time of high 
vulnerability to financial instability because of the potential 
pressure of large capital flows. In this context, as Begg et al.
(2003) point out, the dangerous combination of high capital 
mobility and an intermediate exchange rate peg could be 
avoided if Accession countries were to unilaterally adopt the 
euro without becoming full members of the Euro area. This 
makes sense for countries that are seeking fast entry into the 
Euro area, and which have achieved fiscal responsibility, price 
stability and a sound banking sector, but the Maastricht Treaty 
avoids this possibility. Taking this into account, the risk of 
experiencing currency crises is real. However, if the accession 
economies continue to internationalise their banking systems 
and efficient monitoring mechanisms are implemented, the 
danger of such banking problems should be reduced 
considerably (Eichengreen and Ghironi, 2001). 
Another aspect that should be considered when analysing the 
position of accession countries towards the euro is the degree 
of cyclical synchronicity, as it indicates that the single 
monetary policy will be broadly appropriate for all union 
members. In this sense, when comparing economic 
developments of these countries with those in the Euro area, 
one has to take into account that accession countries are 
involved in a transformation process that leads to a high 
2 Austria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal are not 
included in the analysis to keep homogeneity with later sections, 
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number of structural changes in their economies. Moreover, 
data quality for some of the Accession countries before these 
years cannot be comparable to that in Euro area countries. For 
this reason, the time period considered for the analysis here 
starts in 1993 (or 1995) and the countries considered are the 
following: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Regarding 
EU countries, we analyse both Euro area and Non Monetary 
Union countries, with the exceptions of Austria, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal due to data restrictions. The 
calculations in this chapter use quarterly data obtained from the 
OECD Main Economic Indicators, the IMF International 
Financial Statistics and the European Central Bank data set and 
different national sources.  
As a first look to the analysis of business cycle synchronicity 
between accession countries and the Euro area, we can plot the 
standard deviation of growth and inflation between 1994.I and 
2002.IV (figure 1). It seems clear that the fluctuation of 
inflation and growth rates was higher in accession countries 
than in Euro area countries. These results provide evidence that
there are considerable differences in the business cycles 
between accession countries and Euro area countries, 
confirming the findings in the previous chapter with a different 
methodology. 
Looking at the cross-correlations between real GDP growth 
rates and inflation for accession countries and Euro area
aggregates, during the last ten years there is a clear increase in 
the values of the correlations for the Czech Republic, Estonia 
and the Slovenia, while the situation has worsened for 
Hungary, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic. In fact, on 
average, the results are still below the values of other EU 
countries and, moreover, using a five year rolling window the 
situation has worsened during the last years for nearly all 
countries. It seems that the economic slowdown of 2000 to 
2002 has affected the synchronisation of accession countries 
with the Euro Zone. However, these differences between 
countries and time periods can arise either from differences in 
the shocks that they have experienced, or from differences in 
the responses to these shocks. The above correlation analysis 
cannot discriminate between the two aspects. For example, for 
some countries, the second period lower correlations can be 
due to a strong discipline among the considered countries in 
terms of monetary policy (a self-imposed restriction on 
adjustment mechanisms) rather than to an increase of 
asymmetric shocks. 
In order to distinguish whether  the differences in business 
cycles synchronicity between countries and time periods arise 
because of differences in shocks or differences in the responses 
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Figure 5.1. Growth and inflation in Euro area, Non Monetary Union countries and Accession countries 
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Note:  Axis scales are different in both sets of figures. 
Please note that the axis ranges in the bottom figures are higher than the ranges for the top ones. 
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to these shocks, we consider different Structural VAR models: 
 
• First, the Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992, 1996) 
model where two different kinds of shocks are 
considered: shocks that affect the demand curve (for 
example, due to monetary or fiscal policy changes) and 
shocks that affect the supply curve (for example, 
technological changes). Using appropriate identifying 
assumptions, the series of demand and supply shocks 
can be easily estimated from a structural bivariate 
VAR on output and prices. 
• Second, as the Bayoumi and Eichengreen model 
ignores the potential role of policy in creating shocks 
(see Artis, 2003), two different extensions of the model 
have been specified where two different types of 
demand shock have been considered: Real demand 
shocks (resulting for example from increases in private 
sector spending or government expenditure) and 
nominal demand shocks (resulting from shocks to the 
stance of monetary policy or from shocks arising in 
foreign exchange markets). The first extension of the 
model includes the evolution of real interest rates while 
the second includes the evolution of real exchange 
rates. In both cases, further restrictions are introduced 
to identify real demand, nominal demand and supply 
shocks from the residuals from these trivariate VAR 
models. 
 
The main findings can be summarised as follows: Similarly to 
previous studies (Fidmruc and Korhonen, 2001 or Lättemäe, 
2003), the structural shocks (both supply and real demand 
shocks) are more asymmetric in candidate countries than in 
current Euro area members. However, there are some countries 
that are more ready to adopt the euro from this perspective. For 
example, if we look at supply shocks, the values of the 
correlation coefficients for Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Estonia are quite high. And, in terms of real 
demand shocks the most recent years, only Latvia, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia show negative values of the correlation 
coefficients. 
Some interesting results emerge also from the analysis of 
symmetries in monetary shocks when using the real interest 
rate specification. It seems that monetary shocks in most 
candidate countries are more correlated with Euro area
countries than supply shocks or real demand shocks. This 
result, also found by Lättemäe (2003) for the Baltic countries, 
is especially interesting due to the actual differences between 
the exchange rates systems and levels of financial integration. 
Moreover, it shows that monetary policies in accession 
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Euro area. If this is the case, then the costs of loosing monetary 
independence when joining the euro would be reduced. 
In any case, since on average correlations are still far away 
from the values of the EMU countries, a flexible real sector and 
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Notwithstanding the importance that EU ascribed to 
infrastructure, it was more a matter of conviction than the result 
of analytical studies; indeed, the real effects of these 
investments are far from being clearly identified. Most studies 
analysing the infrastructure impact on regional growth show 
that the relationship between the two is positive. However, the 
public capital elasticity estimated in a Cobb-Douglas function, 
which is the most common specification in these studies, is 
sometimes too large to be credible (Aschauer, 1989). 
Consequently the results have been partially discredited. For 
instance, Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Garcia-Milà et al. (1996) 
criticize the initial findings on positive infrastructure effects in 
the US case on econometric grounds, presenting estimations of 
regional production functions that use standard techniques to 
control for state-specific characteristics, revealing essentially a 
zero role for public capital. Therefore, although there is 
consensus on the need for a certain level of infrastructural 
provision, once this level is reached, different results and 
conclusions are obtained.  
 
This chapter analyses the spatial dimension of infrastructure 
impact on regional economic growth. We assume that the 
effect of infrastructure on industrial productivity depends on 
the various types of public infrastructure, so that local 
infrastructures would enhance economic activity in the area 
where they are located, whereas transport and communication 
infrastructure may produce both benefits in the area where they 
are located and spillovers to other regions. These spillovers can 
be either positive or negative. The positive spillovers would be 
caused by the connectivity characteristic of most transport 
public capital. This network characteristic supposes that any 
piece of a network is related and subordinate to the entire 
network, increasing the interrelationships between regions. 
Hence, part of the infrastructure benefits (if they really exist) 
would fell beyond the limits of the region where it is located. 
Alternatively, the negative spillover would arise from factor 
migration, in the sense that transportation infrastructure in one 
region could have a negative effect in those other regions that 
are the region’s closest competitors for labour and mobile 
capital. In this chapter we check which of these two hypotheses 
on the spillover effect of transport infrastructure is prevalent. 
Chapter 6 
The Impact of Infrastructure on Regional Economic 
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The empirical analysis in order to address the above question 
will rely on the effect of the public capital stock on the industry 
of Spanish regional economies (NUTS III level) during the 
period 1965-1997. 
 
It is worth remembering that both the level of infrastructure 
endowment and the level of economic activity in most Spanish 
regions in the early sixties were far below that of other 
European economies and that both figures have undergone a 
significant increase during the period under consideration, 
especially after the accession to the EU. In this sense, we 
believe that the previous experience of Spain can provide 
guidance as to the role that public capital may play in 
explaining economic growth in the Accession countries. To a 
certain extent, it has been argued that admission countries 
stand, relative to the EU15 average member, in the same 
position in which about twenty years ago, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain stood in relation to the then older members of the EU. 
Boldrin (2003) upon a number of aggregate statistics (GDP per 
capita, labor productivity, share of employment in agriculture 
and openness of the economy) demonstrates that the 
macroeconomic conditions in Accession countries are similar 
to those of previous entrants and the gains from joining the EU 
will be probably comparable to those experienced by the 
previous three newcomers. Even some cultural and historical 
features resemble very much those of Spain at the time of 
accession to the EU: about a decade had elapsed since the 
previous regime collapsed and a number of changes had 
already been implemented. Among the differences of the 
present environment are that current level of economic 
integration within the EU, which is much higher than it was in 
the eighties, and the fact that the Accession countries will enter 
a larger and richer market than the early entrants did (Boldrin 
and Canova, 2003). These features should, in any case, benefit 
Accession countries and should facilitate their integration. 
Another potential difference consists on the fact that the level 
of infrastructure stock in the present Accession countries may 
differ from the level of public capital in Spain at the time of 
accession. Due to the lack of monetary data on infrastructure 
stocks in the Accession countries, we can not conclude whether 
this is a real difference or not. But we know that the level of 
infrastructure endowment in the Spanish case at the moment of 
accession had considerable increased if compared with the 
levels at the seventies and early eighties so that all the benefits 
coming from the infrastructure investment effort in this country 
were not only due to the entrance in the EU. Therefore, 
empirical results for the Spanish case may be understood as the 
effect of infrastructure on the takeoff of less-developed 
economies which are opening and modernizing their productive 
structure as a consequence of their entrance in the EU.  
 


































an empirical model based on the log-linear Cobb-Douglas 
aggregate production function in which public capital is
disaggregated into two main components (local and 
transportation) as well as including a spillover variable for the 
transportation component. The calculation of the spillover 
variable will be computed using the idea of a spatial lag given 
in Spatial Econometrics. Different definitions for connectivity 
will be used when constructing the variable that will reflect the 
infrastructure spillover in order to test its sign and magnitude. 
The three first definitions for connectivity will rely on the idea 
that geographical proximity matters in the interaction across 
regions: physical contiguity (Wbin), the inverse of the distance 
(Wdist), and the third one consisting on the inverse of the square 
of the distance (Wdist2). Apart from the connectivity due to 
closeness in space, we will also consider that relations among 
regions appear due to their similarity in density of population 
(Wdens), and we will take into account the fact that economically 
powerful regions may have a greater impact on the others than 
a poor one, although weighting this power according to the 
distance between the two regions.  
 
Applied to data referring to the industry of the 50 regions of 
Spain (NUTS III level, known as provinces) for the period 
1965-1997, the results we obtain using the fixed-effect 
estimator of panel data techniques are shown in Table 1. In all 
of them it can be concluded that private capital (K) and labour 
(L) elasticities are approximately 0.24 and 0.78, according to 
what is indicated by the theory. The parameter accompanying 
local public capital (G_local) seems robust given its constant 
significance with a value of around 0.06, so that an increase of 
1% in the stock of local public capital would increase value 
added by 0.06%, a modest but significant effect. On the other 
hand, transportation infrastructure (G_trans) is also significant 
although of a somewhat lower value than the local one, varying 
between 0.03 and 0.05. In conclusion, although public capital 
seems to have had a positive impact on Spanish productivity 
growth, this impact is lower than that reported in earlier public 
capital studies, and indeed in line with the most recent ones, 
which conclude that the role of infrastructure is a subtle one. 
Also, in contrast to what happens in the US economy (Holtz-
Eakin, 1994; Garcia-Milà et al., 1996) where controlling for 
state effects reduces or invalidates public capital impact, in the 
Spanish case the use of panel data techniques to control for 
regional effects presents credible values, not only for public 
capital elasticities, but also for labour and private capital 
shares. In our belief, this could be due to the fact that at the 
beginning of the period under consideration Spanish regions 
were lacking in infrastructure; as the provision increased, it had 
a positive influence on productivity growth. Conversely, with 
large initial infrastructure endowment, the US states would 
have reached a saturation point. 
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spillover (W*G_trans), we observe that it is significantly 
negative in all the cases considered. The value of the 
coefficient ranges between the -0.10 for the case of the physical 
contiguity up to the -0.19 in the case of the inverse of the 
distance. Therefore the negative value of the impact of 
transportation infrastructure of region i on the other regions 
would exceed the positive impact that this infrastructure has in 
region i. Not only the closeness concept seems to support the 
negative spillover hypothesis, but also with the other three 
definitions for connectivity, based on similarities across 
regions, the spillover effect results significantly negative with a 
similar magnitude than the one specified before. It seems 
therefore that the negative spillover of infrastructure dominates 
its network characteristic. This result would be in line with the 
ones obtained for the states of the US in Kelejian and Robinson 
(1997) and in Boarnet (1998). 
  
Additionally, it is commonly accepted that the output effect of 
an increase in the public capital stock depends on the size of 
the existing endowment, the degree of its congestion, and the 
level of economic development in the region. Hence, on the 
one hand, additions to infrastructure networks would not have 
the same impact on output growth as the construction of the 
network (presence of decreasing returns for public capital). On 
the other hand, adding capacity to an uncongested endowment 
would not affect private productivity, while the benefits from 
an increase in the amount of public capital would be large 
when congestion is high. These issues can be analysed by 
estimating the marginal effect of output to public capital. These 
marginal effects are computed from the estimates obtained 
when considering the definition of physical contiguity for the 
spillover effect. As observed in Table 2, there appear to be 
Table 6.1. Estimation results 
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decreasing returns for both types of public capital, since the 
regional average value decreases with time. This decrease is 
higher in the case of local infrastructure, where the return has 
constantly diminished from 0.024 to 0.013, a 44% decrease. In 
the case of transportation capital, the decrease represents a 
27%, ranging down from 0.073 to 0.053. Hence, it could be 
said that although infrastructure in Spain has had a significant 
role during the period analysed, it has decreased with time, and 
is unlikely to persist with the same strength in the future. In 
fact, it can be observed that the highest decrease is observed 
after 1987, that is, after the accession of Spain to the EU. This 
is probably due to the fact that public capital at the end of the 
eighties and the beginning of the nineties was getting close to 
the level needed so as not to hinder economic development. 
  
In figures 1 and 2, the time average for the returns is plotted 
against the time average of the stock of public capital both for 
the transportation and local capital. A clear negative 
relationship between both variables is obtained. This is true for 
the endowment of public capital per unit of private capital and 
per unit of output (although only the latter is shown). Again we 
find evidence of the existence of decreasing returns to public 
capital which are working in the Spanish case. 
 
According to our result on the existence of a positive but 
modest impact of public infrastructure on industrial output, it 
can be concluded that new developments in the EU policies 
should renew interest in ensuring that infrastructure policy 
should, at least, not hinder economic development. This could 
be especially relevant for Accession countries, less developed 
than others in Europe and with lower endowments of public 
capital, whose main purpose is to reduce disparities in relation 
Table 6.2. Returns to transport and local public capital. Regional average 
Return G_trans  Return G_local 
1965 0.073   1965 0.239   
1967 0.07 1983 0.07 1967 0.226 1983 0.18 
1969 0.074 1985 0.066 1969 0.229 1985 0.174 
1971 0.078 1987 0.07 1971 0.228 1987 0.173 
1973 0.08 1989 0.069 1973 0.228 1989 0.168 
1975 0.078 1991 0.062 1975 0.233 1991 0.155 
1977 0.071 1993 0.053 1977 0.216 1993 0.136 
1979 0.073 1995 0.053 1979 0.221 1995 0.134 
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to them. Given the similarities observed between Spain at the 
time of accession and the Accession countries at the present 
time, similar to what happened in Spain, there seems to be still 
a potential for industry for getting output benefits from public 
capital, both from local and transportation infrastructure, 
although these benefits tend to decrease with the increases in 
the stock of public capital. Our results also indicate that a 
region’s output is negatively related to the stock of 
transportation infrastructure in other regions. This negative 
output spillover from transport public capital can be due to the 
fact that when input factors are mobile, transportation 
infrastructure in one region can draw industrial production 
away from other regions. In other words, regions with similar 
infrastructure would compete for mobile factors of production. 
Therefore, in early stages, the use of public investment to 
deepen an integration process may increase disparities, since 
regions with weak competitive positions may be adversely 
affected. Politically, the presence of negative spillovers would 
imply that regions could use infrastructure as a competitive tool 
for attracting factors of production and thus increasing their 
own industrial output at the expense of the other regions. In 
such a case, each region would try to provide more 
infrastructures that it would have otherwise provided. 
Therefore, EU regional policy should have this result in mind, 
since the possibility that the decision that public capital should 




Returns to public capital. Time average. (returns based on the estimation with Wbin) 
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After the overthrow of their socialist regimes in 1989/90, most 
Accession countries redirected their political and economic 
focus towards the European Union. This process has already 
profoundly transformed their economies and is certain to 
trigger further adjustments. Lower barriers to trade and factor 
mobility will yield aggregate gains that are well understood by 
economists and estimated to be significant (see e.g. Baldwin et 
al., 1997). 
 
Although the potential for aggregate gains from EU 
enlargement is undisputed, economists also acknowledge that 
integration transforms the internal structures of national 
economies, which can have important distributional 
consequences. One dimension of integration-induced 
restructuring concerns geography. How does European 
integration impact on the spatial distribution of activities, 
prices and incomes between and within countries? This 
question has in recent years been an object of intense scrutiny 
by both academic and policy-oriented economists, and it 
remains one of the most active areas of research for European 
economics. 
 
For the academic researcher, these countries present an 
interesting “laboratory case”, due to their legacy of centrally 
planned economic structures and rapid trading reorientation 
towards the EU. Is the old centrally planned spatial 
organisation of those economies unravelling and giving way to 
a different geographic distribution of activities, shaped by 
market forces? If so, what is the nature of these forces, and 
what new spatial equilibrium is likely to emerge? These 
questions are of evident interest to policy makers too, 
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Market Forces Vs. Central Planning 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a model from the “New 
Economic Geography” (NEG) literature, that is particularly 
well suited to the European context.  
In these models, the key determinant of industrial location and 
wages is market access. An increase in profitability of a region 
will be translated into adjustments either in terms of factor 
prices (higher wages) or in terms of output (higher 
employment). The better a region’s access to large markets 
(and pools of suppliers), the higher its wages and the greater its 
locational attractiveness for trade-oriented sectors.  
As an alternative to the market-driven spatial structure 
described by the model, we formulate a “Comecon 
hypothesis”, based on the idea that the artifice of central 
planning created economic geographies whose only regularity 
is a concentration of certain sectors and high wages in the 
capital region. 
 
The evolution of Trade Integration 
 
The first step of our empirical analysis is to document the 
degree of trade integration of Accession countries with the four 
largest current EU economies. We use a simple measure of 






where m stands for exports, i and j denote countries, and own-
country exports are calculated as output minus total exports. 
 
Figure 1 compares average “trade freeness” measures of five 
Accession countries and of Spain with respect to four of the 
largest EU economies. It appears that, in spite of their marked 
opening towards the EU since 1990, the Accession countries 
are still less economically integrated with the EU than Spain. 
The first interesting point to note is that in 1986, when Spain 
entered the EU, its level of “trade freeness” vis à vis the EU 
was similar to the levels experienced in 1999 (our latest sample 
year) by Poland, Hungary and Slovenia. Second, we can see 
that the level of trade integration of the Accession countries 
with the EU is quite homogeneous; an upward trend starts in 
1990, with the beginning of the signature and implementation 
of the Europe Agreements, aimed to liberalise trade 






















The internal geography of Accession countries 
 
We analyse the internal economic geographies of Central 
European Accession countries, drawing on regional data for 
wages and sectoral employment in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Specifically, we 
examine regional wages and employment shares and look for 
spatial gradients inside each country  
We also compare wages and employment gradients in 
Accession countries with those observed in existing EU 
member countries. Specifically, we regress regional nominal 
wages and regional employment shares of eight sectors on a 
range of variables representing market access. The main two 
explanatory variables are a region’s distance from the national 
capital and its distance from Brussels. In addition we include 
dummy variables for capital regions, regions bordering the EU, 
regions bordering other Accession countries and coastal 
regions. 
 
These regressions are estimated using a new and uniquely 
comprehensive regional data set for the five Accession 
countries plus a comparison group of 16 EU and EFTA 
countries, covering the 1996-2000 period. By interacting the 
market access variables with a variable that identifies the five 
Accession countries, we can estimate to what extent the 
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internal geographies of accession economies differ from those 
of established member countries. If we assume, quite plausibly, 
that the existing EU economies are closer to their long-run 
spatial equilibrium than those of Accession countries, we can 
interpret any significant effects on the interaction variables as 
an (inverse) indicator of impending spatial changes in 
Accession countries. 
 
The results for the wage equations are given in table 1. For the 
EU, we find statistically significant continuous wage gradients 
with respect to the capital. The statistically significant 
coefficients on interaction terms confirm that the geography of 
wages is very different in Accession countries, where wages 
are discretely higher in capital regions.  
When we compare internal employment gradients of Accession 
countries with those of existing EU members, we find a similar 
result: Accession countries are marked by significantly stronger 
concentrations of employment in both market and public 
service sectors in their capital manufacturing employment. 
Manufacturing jobs in Accession countries seem to be 
relatively under-represented in and near capital regions as well 
as in EU border regions. We can interpret these findings as 
evidence of a legacy from central planning, under which 
manufacturing plants were often located on the basis of purely 
political considerations. Our analysis therefore suggests a 
tendency for increasing agglomeration of manufacturing 
activities near the capital regions of Accession countries and 
near the border with the EU, confirming a result we reported in 





We have drawn on a multi-region NEG model to study the 
internal economic geographies of five Central European 
Accession countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia). According to the theory, the external 
trade liberalisation represented by progressing integration into 
the EU market will have significant location effects in those 
countries.  
 
Referring to the predictions of New Economic Geography 
models, we have studied the internal economic geography of 
five Accession countries, by analysing the spatial structure of 




Table 7.1: wage gradient estimations  
Dependent variable: ( )ctri ww /ln  Model :  
(P) (Q) (R) 
In dist. to capital  -0.071 -0.065 -0.086 
 (-7.58) (-5.07) (-6.60) 
In dist. to cap x Accession Countries -0.037 0.032 0.047 
 (-2.71) (2.14) (3.15) 
In dist. to Brussels 0.085 0.081 0.097 
 (3.33) (2.89) (3.62) 
In dist. to Bru. x Accession Countries -0.094 -0.178 -0.079 
 (-1.71) (-4.29) (-1.73) 
Accession Countries 0.791 1.030 0.297 
 (2.20) (3.92) (1.01) 
Capital   0.030 0.022 
  (0.69) (0.53) 
Capital x Accession Countries  0.257 0.261 
  (5.23) (5.66) 
Land border with EU, N, CH   0.071 
   (5.64) 
Accession Countries x land border with 
EU,N,CH 
  -0.040 
(-2.73) 
Land border with Accession Countries   -0.018 
(-1.75) 



































In the Accession 
countries, 
border regions 
have a higher 
relative wage 
Using a measure of trade freeness (i.e. trade integration) 
between the Accession countries and the EU, a first set of 
results shows that there is a clear increasing trend in trade 
integration since 1990, up to the point that some of the future 
member states seem to have reached the level of trade 
integration that Spain had with the EU at the time of its 
accession.  
We then studied how regional wages and employment shares in 
the Accession countries reacted to the increased access to EU 
markets. The results support both the "New Economic 
Geography" predictions and the "Comecon hypothesis". Three 
points are to be emphasised.  
First, there is a strong effect of the capital on relative wages. 
On average, being a capital city yields a 32% higher wage, and 
doubling the distance to the capital reduces the relative wage 
by 4%.  
Second, proximity to the EU seems to give an advantage in 
terms of relative wage. However, this effect only reflects the 
wage premium enjoyed by border regions. Workers' wage in 
those regions lies in average 1.028 times above other regions' 
wage.  
Concerning employment shares, the share of service 
employment (in the private as well as in the public sector) is 
strongly concentrated in capital regions. The comparison with 
the current EU countries shows that these concentrations are
significantly stronger in the Accession countries than in the 
long-established member states.  
 
What can we conclude from this analysis? Based on our 
estimations, we conjecture that the extreme centralisation of 
wages and service sectors in Central European capital cities is 
likely to erode and give way to smoother gradients driven by 
market access. In sum, both the theory and our comparative 
estimations suggest that Accession countries’ regions nearest 
the border to the current EU stand to gain most in terms of 




Integration is likely 
to benefit the 
regions sharing a 






























The European Union is implementing the sixth enlargement of 
its history. Among others, this raises the following policy 
question: 
• Taking the enlargement process as a given, what would 
the best policies be for the EU to fuel real convergence 
at the national and regional level? 
In the next Section, we argue that, although economically 
backward, Accession countries stand on average, relative to the 
EU15 average member, roughly in the same position in which, 
about twenty or so years ago, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain (GIPS, from now on) stood in relation to the then older 
members of the EEC. Admittedly this picture does hinder 
discrepancies at the regional level: whether such sub-regional 
income disparities should be tackled at the centralised level of 
the EU rather than on the local level remains however 
questionable; anyway, heterogeneity among acceding countries 
dominates. Based on a large body of previous research related 
to the previous enlargement, we point out to mixed evidence 
concerning the effect of EU structural policies on the process 
of economic convergence of acceding countries. The policy 
conclusions can be found in section 3. 
 
 Initial conditions in the Accession countries 
 
Per capita income and labour productivity 
Accession countries are poor according to GDP per capita, 
measured in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). The GDP per 
capita of the mean acceding country has oscillated between 
about 36 and 42 percent of the EU average, the oscillations 
reflecting, to a large extent, changing business cycle 
conditions. Roughly speaking, there is little difference between 
relative labour productivity and relative GDP per-capita. Hence 
the conclusion that, on average, Accession countries are at 
about 40 percent of EU15 in per-capita income, with Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Slovenia displaying above average 
growth performances while the rest grows, more or less, at the 
same rate as the EU. Within acceding countries, disparities 
among regions have to be added to this global picture. 
However, inequality among countries dwarfs the within 
Chapter 8 



























countries’ FDI to 
GDP ratio is 




Most of the FDI 





Saving and Investment 
Capital comes in two forms, human and physical. When one 
looks at a pure measure of the average number of years of 
schooling attended, the Accession countries, with 9.8 years of 
schooling on average, come on top of the EU15 mean, which 
was only 9.5 in 1999 (OECD). This would lead to the, in our 
view incorrect, conclusion that the quality of the Accession 
countries labour force is, from a strictly economic viewpoint, 
as good as that to be found in the average EU15 country. Plenty 
of anecdotal evidence suggests this is not the case. 
Nevertheless, it should also be stressed that controlling for 
content and for quality of schooling, the average Accession
country may be somewhat below the EU15 average human 
capital stock, but this adjustment is unlikely to make a major 
difference. 
The picture is less rosy when one looks at machines, 
equipment, plants, infrastructures and so forth. There are two 
problems in this respect: bad initial conditions (obsolete 
factories and infrastructures) and relative low investment rates 
since the transition started. In the EU over the last 10 years, the 
investment rate has been 17.6 percent on average, with little 
variations around that level. The four Cohesion countries all 
had investment rates in excess of 20 percent during the 1990s. 
Assuming similar depreciation rates of about 10 per cent a 
year, a steady state EU level of capital/output ratio of 1.7 and 
an initial capital/output ratio of 1.3 for the Cohesion countries, 
it will take them approximately other 10 years to match the EU 
capital/output ratio. 
The role of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in bringing 
backward countries’ capital stock and labour productivity in 
line with the ones of the developed world is well understood, 
and confirmed by a number of positive growth experiences in 
Europe and elsewhere (see, e.g., Martin et al. (2001)). The 
proportion of FDIs in the total investment of Accession
countries displays an increasing trend, in particular after 1995-
96. The ratio of FDI to GDP is, on average, more than twice as 
large as the corresponding number for the EU (5 as compared 
to 2 percent). For some Accession countries the net FDI inflow 
as a percentage of GDP has reached fairly high levels (11 
percent in Slovakia, 8 in the Czech republic, 8 in Estonia). 
For others, it is still around 2 or 3 percent of GDP. Over two-
thirds of the FDI in Accession countries come from the EU; 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria are providing the largest 
amounts, while Poland, the Czech republic and Hungary are the 
largest recipients, taking about 70 percent of the total flow to 

















…but are still 










Labour markets in Accession countries displayed complex 
trends in the last decade. Activity rates in the 15-64 age group 
oscillated without a precise trend and are currently comparable 
to EU15 averages (slightly below 70 percent) with Hungary 
and Bulgaria being, from an historical perspective, the worst (at 
about 60 percent) and Romania the best (at about 75 percent). 
Employment rates in the same age group are not worse than 
those registered, on average, in the EU15 (about 64 percent). In 
comparison, with the EU15 laggards (Greece, Italy and Spain, 
all travelling around a 55 percent employment rate) only 
Bulgaria (51 percent) scores lower, while Romania, with a 69 
percent employment rate, still stands out at the top. Second, 
even if now equal to those in the EU15, participation rates have 
declined substantially over the decade and are currently about 5 
percent lower than in 1991. The large increase in 
unemployment and the fall in participation rates contrast 
dramatically with the dynamics of unit labour costs (defined as 
real wages divided by productivity) (ULC). According to the 
ULC metric only Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, the Slovak 
republic have managed to keep the growth rate of real wages 
roughly in line with labour productivity gains. 
At the opposite extreme is Romania where, because of the long 
stagnation in labour productivity, unit labour costs have more 
than doubled over the period. One should stress, though, that, 
as of 2000, unit labour costs are still 50 percent lower in the 
average Accession country than in the EU (see Eurostat 
(2001a)). 
Since 1999 the unemployment level has began to slowly 
decrease in the majority of the Accession countries, Bulgaria 
being again the most serious exception to this trend. This also 
appears to follow a tendency common to the EU15, even if 
there are no examples of employment miracles which could be 
compared to e.g., the Netherlands or Ireland. But then, again, 
there are no examples among the Accession countries of 
courageous labour market reforms either. Therefore, the 
appropriate comparison to be made is with those EU economies 
in which unemployment is still high and labour markets are 
still heavily regulated, e.g. Germany, France, Italy and Spain. 
When this comparison is made, recent movements in labour 
markets in the Accession countries resemble very much those 
in the countries of the EU. 
 
Growth Accounting 
Make the following assumptions: 
• The share of labour in national income is 70 percent. 
This roughly corresponds to the estimate obtained 

























account for most 
of the growth in 
per capita GDP 
 
• Capital stock increments are computed summing up 
investment over the period and subtracting yearly 
depreciation. Data for depreciation is available only for 
the three Baltic States, in which the depreciation rate is 
estimated to be 40, 47 and 52 percent of the gross 
investment rate. These estimates seem to be on the 
high end of the distribution, hence we use a value of 40 
percent for the remaining countries. 
• Since no information about part-time vs. full time 
labour is available, the increments of the labour input 
are computed using bodies. Data for Hungary indicates 
that the accounting discrepancy between using bodies 
and hours is small. We expect the same to hold for the 
remaining nine countries. 
• The increment in the domestic stock of capital is 
calculated as a residual, subtracting FDI increments 
from total increments. The same depreciation rate is 
applied to domestic capital and FDI. Since the 
technological content of FDI is higher and its 
depreciation is probably lower, this procedure biases 
FDI’s contribution downward. 
• Since reliable data on FDI flows are available only for 
a subset of the 10 years we consider, we make the 
assumption that FDI were zero in all the non-available 
years. Again, this assumption biases downward the 
estimated contribution of FDI to growth. 
• We calculate the contribution to growth of the 
shrinking of the agricultural sector by multiplying the 
average labour share by the decrement in the 
population employed in agriculture. 
The relative contributions of labour and capital follow 
analogous patterns across countries: the capital stock has a 
small influence while the contribution of labour to growth is 
negative. 
Averaging over the whole Accession countries, TFP changes 
have contributed to growth for about 2.2 percent per year out of 
a total of 2.5 percent per year (roughly 88 percent). This result 
is not unusual. With few exceptions, TFP invariably accounts 
for most of the growth in per-capita output. However, this 
average masks substantial cross country differences. For 
example, in Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia and Poland, TFP 
growth would have implied GDP growth in excess of 4.0 
percent, had the two production inputs remained constant, 
while in Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech republic the 
contribution of TFP changes to growth has been either negative 
or negligible. For Hungary and Poland, two of the largest 
recipients of FDI in the group, TFP contribution is positive but 
not large. While this heterogeneous behaviour may require 
further country-by-country investigation, what we collect from 





























growth but is 
not sufficient 
countries constitutes no exception to the growth accounting 
rule: GDP increases because TFP does, whatever the cause of 
the latter may be. 
 
Regional Inequalities in the Accession countries 
Regional inequalities are not very large in the Accession group 
and, to some extent, they are smaller or at most comparable to 
those already present in the EU15. There are two reasons for 
this: most Accession countries are small, in size and 
population, and this fact limits heterogeneity among reasonably 
sized internal territorial units; even if it magnifies the 
heterogeneity among EU25 regions, the high level of inequality 
among countries (one to three in per-capita GDP) dwarfs the 
within country differences. 
This is a crucial fact to be kept in mind when thinking about 
economic growth and convergence in the Accession countries: 
regional and national economic convergence are, to a first 
approximation, the same problem. Hence, the extent to which 
regional disparities are a problem for the acceding countries is 
smaller than that for some of the current EU15 member. 
Basically, regional disparities are relevant only in countries 
(such as Poland and Romania) which are large enough for 
regional comparisons to make sense. For the rest, concentrating 
on regional income inequalities would be tantamount to asking 
if provincial or intercity inequalities in, say, Lombardy or 
Andalucia are important for aggregate economic growth and 
require intervention via some specific structural policies. For 
example, the city-region of Prague in the Czech Republic has a 
population of about 1.5 million people (about 15 per cent of the 
country total), enjoys an income per-capita of 122 percent of 
EU average and an unemployment rate of 3.4 percent. The 
other eight Czech regions, host the remaining 8.9 million 
people, score around 49-56 percent of the EU average in term 
of income and display unemployment rates between 5 and 15 
per cent. These are significant variations, although not much 
different from those existing between any capital city in EU 
and its countryside. 
 
Can we assess the impact of past EU cohesion 
policies? 
The predictions of “new growth” or “new trade” theory models 
are that trade openness combined with increasing returns and a 
variety of external effects can eventually translate into 
agglomeration phenomena, poverty traps, economic divergence 
and increased inequality. 
Agglomeration theories, in particular, predict that capital and 
labour will, under certain conditions, agglomerate in a few 
privileged areas, leaving the rest far behind as a result of 
economic integration. Hence the need for active public 




































where it would not, otherwise, take place. Applied to the 
European experience of cohesion policies, the accuracy of such 
recommendations is questionable. Studies agree that the 
observed economic convergence across countries has been 
mainly driven by Ireland. Reciprocally the Italian Mezzogiorno 
has not converged; moreover, an assessment based on a true 
regional level would not authorise to conclude to convergence. 
The problem here is to assess the responsibility role of 
European policies in these evolutions. In absence of proper 
counterfactual due to a lack of statistics at the adequate level of 
regional disaggregation, it is impossible to statistically assess 
what has eventually been the impact of cohesion policies. What 
microeconomic evidence tells us however is that the quality of 
local institutions and business environment in regions 
benefiting from European funding has been decisive. 
This is confirmed by the second lesson we have learned: trade 
integration facilitates economic growth but is far from 
guaranteeing it, especially if appropriate internal economic 
policies are not adopted. Empirical evidence has consistently 
shown that when reasonably large territorial units are chosen 
for the analysis, opening up trade and allowing internal markets 
to work lead to a certain degree of convergence (see e.g. Ben 
David (1994)).  
It should be self-evident that this does not mean that the 
transfers involved with the structural policies made no 
difference for the countries and regions on the receiving end. 
They certainly did and still do: receiving a nice yearly cheque 
of an amount in between two and five percent of national 
income is valuable. But to claim that they have made a 
difference for growth is an entirely different matter. From the 
large body of literature available, we should mention here a 
most recent one. Pedro Arevalo (2003) has carried out a 
painstaking and meticulous investigation of Spanish regional 
development since the late 1950s, using a high quality data set 
of both provincial and regional human, public, and private 
capital stocks, and sectoral value added. He shows that TFP 
growth accounts for the lion’s share of economic growth and 
convergence across Spanish regions, with little left for public 
and private capital and a somewhat larger share for human 
capital. More importantly, he shows internal and external trade 
liberalisation coupled with factor movements across Spanish 
regions are the driving forces behind Spanish economic 
convergence at the regional level. 
While speaking against current EU regional policy is a political 
taboo, other people have also started looking at the question. 
Boldrin and Canova (2001), show econometrically that, at least 
in the EU15, the conjecture that regional transfer policies are 
behind the partial convergence episodes, is not supported by 
the data. Regional policies, at least in the form implemented by 
the EU since the middle 1980s, made little difference on long 

























de Groot and Nahuis (2002) use a statistical methodology 
which is quite different from Boldrin and Canova (2001), but 
reach similar conclusions. The recent East German experience 
seems to lend strong support to this claim: badly conceived, 
very generous and sustained transfer policies do not spur 
economic growth and convergence. 
 
Conclusion 
It is worth recalling what regional policies are about and how 
they are supposed to work. 
Structural funds are transfers supported by distorting taxation, 
which imply a deadweight loss. The deadweight loss could be 
justified, on public policy grounds, if the social rate of return 
from the investments financed via structural funds was large 
enough to compensate both for this deadweight loss and for the 
opportunity cost of the funds. The latter, after all, could have 
been used by private agents in other productive activities. To 
decide what a reasonable social rate of return on public 
investment should be is a hard task, and we are not going to try 
to quantify it here. The Congressional Budget Office of the US 
Congress, for example, recommends a 10 percent real annual 
return as an absolute minimum for any public investment 
project. Has such a minimum rate of return been obtained by 
the investments financed by the EU Structural Funds? Even 
without capitalisation, the cumulated investment financed by 
Structural and Cohesion Funds in Spain amounts to at least 40 
percent of Spanish GDP. This is a benevolent choice, first 
because we are not capitalising and second because the number 
would have been 70 percent for Portugal and more than a 100 
percent for Greece. Have Structural Funds increased, e.g. 
Spanish GDP of at least 4 percentage points each year during 
the last ten? 
 
Reforming EU Regional Policies. Suggestions 
The theoretical principles underlying the EU regional and 
structural policies are, prima facie, commendable and hard to 
dispute. The Commission calls for (i) concentration of funding 
where it is most needed, on the base of explicit and certified (ii) 
planning of such intervention in (iii) cooperation with local and 
national authorities whose funding the EU transfer are suppose 
to (iv) complement (with co-funding going from 50 to 80 
percent of the value of the project). As it is often the case, 
reality is quite different. We have already insisted on the lack 
of both common and economic sense behind the choice of 
NUTS2 and NUTS3 regions as the territorial levels at which 
economic convergence should be measured. We will not harp 
further on this point, but list it as the first natural step in a long-
due reform of European regional policies: elect territorial units 
that are both homogenous and large enough to make 
convergence in per-capita GDP a reasonable target and 































suggests choosing areas with a population of about ten million 
people. In the light of the accession this would imply that 
convergence should be measured at a country level, exception 
made for Poland and Romania. A very similar argument is 
developed by Sapir et al. (2003), Chapter 8. 
The choice of appropriate territorial units for measuring 
convergence brings together the issue of the level at which 
resources are funnelled. Currently various sub-national 
administrative levels are involved, sometimes particularly 
small ones. Theoretically the choice of subnational units is 
meant to stimulate decentralisation. However, the restrictions 
imposed make the approach resemble a degenerate form of 
fiscal federalism. First, the administrative entities involved are 
very unequal and since the Commission imposes homogenous 
technical requirements on planning, financing and 
implementing the projects, this places a huge burden on small 
regions or administrative units. All but a handful of very large 
local administrations use the services of consulting companies 
located in Brussels to handle Structural Funds projects. 
Alternatively, they let their central governments elaborate, 
present, bargain and manage those projects in their behalf - not 
much decentralisation and/or federalism. 
Italy, where Structural Funds for the Mezzogiorno are de facto 
handled, coordinated, and almost dished out by a dedicated 
"Direzione Generale" at the Italian Treasury is the most 
egregious example. 
Second, while EU funding is not supposed to replace local 
spending, it obviously does because of the aggregate budget 
constraint at the level at which resources are funnelled. 
Furthermore, as central governments are active partners in the 
funding process and are allocating national resources to the 
same regional entities to which European funds go, it is at the 
level of central governments budgeting that substitution takes 
place. With the sole exception of Germany, the administrative 
units involved have little or no autonomous fiscal power: their 
resources flow from central governments which, obviously, 
count European Structural Funds provisions as part of total 
financing. Finally, the desired territorial concentration of 
funding is, to say the least, long gone: not a single country of 
the EU15 goes without receiving some regional subsidy. 
Counting in a map of Europe, the number of NUTS2 regions 
receiving some transfer under some objective one reaches more 
than ninety percent of the total. In fact, at most 70 percent of 
the total amount of funding goes to areas with an income per-
capita lower than the EU average. 
The recognition that structural and cohesion funds are just 
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transfer payments across countries used to facilitate political 
bargaining and coalition building is probably not forthcoming. 
Still, two reforms should be advocated. One is a drastic 
lowering of the maximum income for admission to funding. A 
level equal to 50 percent of the EU average would, in our view, 
be a good choice, allowing funds to really be concentrated 
where they are most needed. Such cutoff would not only 
exclude all current EU members from funding but, among the 
Accession countries, would also let Slovenia, the Czech 
republic and possibly Hungary out. Of the first entrants, only 
Poland (minus the metropolitan area of Warsaw) would clearly 
be a potential beneficiary of structural funds. It seems most 
likely that (by 2008) Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania 
would still be below fifty percent of EU average income per 
capita and therefore qualify for this target. Secondly, a 
reduction of the number of objectives to be pursued is to be 
recommended (as proposed by the Commission in 1998 and 
being implemented currently). In our view objective 1, 
properly rephrased to focus on structural deficiencies 
(especially large public goods, transportation and 
communication infrastructures and environmental protection), 
is the only one that should be retained on a permanent basis. In 
the light of the accession, it appears that objective 2 (recovery 
from industrial restructuring) and objective 5 (agriculture 
structural transformation) should also be maintained during the 
first budgeting cycle following admission (2007-2013) because 
of the relevance of both industrial and agricultural restructuring 
in these countries. Sapir et al. (2003) suggest that the 
improvement of administrative capacity and institution 
building should be given priority in the allocation of funds. 
Both evidence and economic theory suggest that, given a 
stable macroeconomic environment, the presence or lack of 
supply side incentives play a crucial role in determining long 
run regional performances. Accordingly, national policies such 
as reduction in fiscal pressure, accompanied by parallel 
reduction in public spending, play an important role. Capital 
and labour mobility, together with a competitive level of labour 
income taxation also play a role in fostering real convergence. 
The experiences of Ireland, Portugal and the Italian North-East 
in the EU15 and of Poland and Estonia in the Accession 
countries show that sustained above average economic growth 
is the consequence of an attractive environment for FDIs and 
new small firm creation, risk-taking entrepreneurial behaviour, 
exploitation of local comparative advantages via enhanced 
labour and capital mobility. Low marginal taxes, efficient 
transportation and communication infrastructures, good 
financial facilities, a relatively flexible supply of high level 
human capital appear as the key ingredients for the 
establishment of a growth friendly environment. 
 






























growth effects of regional structural funds and of the 
particularly acute political tensions their availability and 
allocation creates among current members, one could re-
consider the emphasis put on these funds within the enlarged 
EU as appropriate convergence policies. This applies, with 
stronger force, to the funding of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, if not to its objectives and existence. Pure income 
transfers with little long-run effects may lead to a suboptimal 
allocation of regional labour, capital and entrepreneurial 
resources and to a self-perpetuating system of expectations, as
well as corruption and underground activities. Hence, we 
would recommend a threefold policy: i) the phasing out of 
Structural funds, ii) their focus on few objectives and iii) 
incentives to pursue sound economic policies aiming at 
providing the right business climate in which transfers will 
have positive impacts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
